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Since Congress first created the circuit courts of appeals
in 1891,1 each state has always been included wholly within a
single circuit. A series of bills now before Congress would
break that tradition as part of an effort to give relief to the
courts of appeals with the heaviest caseloads. 2 Following the
recommendation of the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, 3 the bills propose to divide the

' Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517 § 2, 26 Stat. 826. The official designation of the
courts was changed from "United States Circuit Court of Appeals" to "United
States Court of Appeals" by the Judicial Code of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1970).
See 7B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 3-1, at 85-86 (1974). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 93-102 (1927).

2 S. 2988, S. 2989 & S. 2990, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The three bills propose
realignments of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. They differ in the changes contemplated for the present Fifth Circuit, but the proposed division of the present Ninth
Circuit is the same in all three.
3 COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE
GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS; RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR CHANGE, 62 F.R.D. 223, 235 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
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present Ninth Circuit into two new circuits, with the boundaries drawn so that two of the federal judicial districts of Cal4
ifornia would be placed in one circuit, and two in the other.
The Northern and Eastern Districts, sitting at San Francisco
and Sacramento respectively, would be included in a realigned
Ninth Circuit along with Hawaii, Guam, and five northwestern
states. The Southern and Central Districts, sitting at San Diego
and Los Angeles respectively, would be placed in a Twelfth
Circuit together with Arizona and Nevada.
In the course of introducing the circuit realignmerit bills,
Senator Burdick, Chairman of the Senate's Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery and a member of the
Commission, explained:
Because the State of California comprises 10 percent
of the national population and . . . alone generates
two-thirds of the judicial business of the present ninth
circuit, the Commission concluded that the only feasible realignment of states within the ninth circuit must
include a division of the four judicial districts in California between the two new circuits in the west.5
The underlying problems of judicial administration which led
to the Commission's recommendation 6 are iot idiosyncratic to
the Ninth Circuit, however, nor is California the only state
for which division between circuits might be urged. The four
The Commission was created by Congress in the Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-489, § 1, 86 Stat. 807. For discussion of the problems of the courts of appeals
which led to the creation of the Commission, see H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTIOk
31-47 (1973); Hearings on S.J. Res. 122 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings on
H.R. 7378 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971); COMMIsSION REPORT, supra, 227-230; Carrington, Crowded Dockets and
the Courts of Appeals, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969).
4 The Commission also recommended that the present Fifth Circuit be divided
into two new circuits. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 230-34. No other changes
in circuit composition were recommended.
5 120 CONG. REC. S 1419 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1974).
6 The rapid increase in the caseloads of the courts of appeals has seriously affected the judicial process. In some circuits oral arguments have been drastically
curtailed and decisions without opinions have become common. Simply increasing
the number of judges on the busiest circuits is not an adequate solution, for "[s]erious
problems of administration and of internal operation" result when the membership
of a court is expanded beyond a certain number. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3,
at 227. The plight of the Ninth Circuit has becofnie especially critical:
Since 1968 the number of appeals filed each year has consistently exceeded
the number of terminations, resulting in a backlog of 170 cases per judgeship
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judicial districts of New York furnish an even larger proportion of the Second Circuit's caseload than California contributes to the Ninth Circuit.7 Early in its deliberations the Commission considered the suggestion that New York, too, should
be divided between circuits. Ultimately it concluded that such
a change is not now warranted; but if the Second Circuit's
caseload continues' to increase, the idea is likely to emerge
again. Indeed, unless the "flood-tide of appellate filings" '8 suddenly ebbs, Congress may find it advisable to consider bifurcating yet other states, even if "national panels" or "national
divisions" are created to share the workload of the regional
appellate courts. 9 The issues raised by the Commission's proposal thus have a significance that goes beyond the borders of
one state or one circuit and beyond the immediate desirability
of the pending legislation.
This Article will explore the legal consequences of dividing the state of California between two circuits in accordance
with the Commission's recommendation. Two kinds of inquiries
are relevant. First, is the proposal feasible? What kinds of
problems might be anticipated? How serious would they be,
and how frequently might they arise? Second, if the plan were
enacted, what would be the best way to make the system work?
What steps might be taken by courts or legislatures to avoid
or mitigate possible conflicts?
It is important to emphasize that the ultimate desirability
of legislation implementing the Commission's recommendation
(or any future proposals along similar lines) will not and should
at the end of Fiscal Year 1973-enough to keep the court busy for a full year
even if no new cases were filed. Delays in the disposition of civil cases, often
of two years or more, have seriously concerned both judges and members
of the bar. The size of the court (13 authorized judgeships since 1968) and
the extensive reliance it has been required to place on the assistance of
district and visiting judges have threatened its institutional unity. Attorneys
and judges have been troubled by apparently inconsistent decisions by
different panels of the large court; they are concerned that conflicts within
the circuit may remain unresolved.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 234-35.
7 In fiscal year 1973, 88% of the filings in the Second Circuit came to the court
from the four districts of New York State. California was responsible for 67% of the

Ninth Circuit's cases. See 1973

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Table B-3 (preliminary ed.) [hereinafter cited
as ANNUAL REPORT]. These figures are adjusted to reflect appeals from administrative
agencies and original proceedings. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 233 n. 1.
8 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 227.

9See note 88 infra & accompanying text.
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not turn solely on the issues considered here. Whatever the
problems that might arise as a result of dividing the state, they
must be weighed against the disadvantages of other possible
responses to the massive appellate caseloads coming to the federal courts from the West Coast states. 10 Any course of action,
including maintenance of the status quo, entails various costs,
many of which implicate psychological and sociological considerations not easily articulated or measured. Nevertheless, before any balancing of costs can be intelligently undertaken,
one must make an informed judgment about those factors
which do lend themselves to legal analysis. This Article is put
forward in the hope of advancing that aspect of the debate.
I.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEMS

Although the division of a state between two circuits would
be unprecedented in the history of the federal judiciary, the
problems to be anticipated are far from unique. Certainly it
would be no innovation for the federal government to maintain, within the borders of a single state, two or more courts
of equal stature and frequently overlapping jurisdiction."
Twenty-four states today contain more than one federal judicial district, 1 2 and the districts within a state may take different
positions on important points of law. When they do, the resulting conflicts may go unresolved for years; some may never be
resolved at all, especially if the issue is one which can seldom
be raised on appeal.' 3 At the appellate level within a single
state, conflicting rules of federal constitutional law have been
handed down by the federal court of appeals and the state's
highest court-tribunals whose decisions can be reviewed only
by the United States Supreme Court. Until the Supreme Court
chooses to resolve the disputed issue, the interpretations of
both courts retain their claims to be authoritative. 1 4 Nor would
10 In recent years the Ninth Circuit has handled more cases annually than any
other circuit except the Fifth, which the Commission describes as "beleaguered."
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 234. The Ninth Circuit's filings in fiscal year
1973 totalled 2,316. The state of California alone accounted for more filings in the
Ninth Circuit than there were in six of the other ten federal judicial circuits. See
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, Table B-3.
11The first permanent division of a state between federal judicial districts occurred in 1814, when New York was divided into a southern and a northern district.
Act of Apr. 9, 1814, ch. 49, § 1, 3 Stat. 120.
12 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (1970).
13See, e.g., notes 28 & 80 infra.
14 See text accompanying notes 187-98 infra.

1974]

DIVIDING A STATE BETWEEN FEDERAL CIRCUITS

it be a novelty, under evolving rules of personal jurisdiction
and choice of law, for the law of a particular state to be applied
and interpreted by more than one court of appeals. 15 Finally,
an American lawyer would hardly be surprised to learn that
the outcome of a legal dispute might turn on the selection of
the forum by one of the litigants. Forum shopping is a familiar
phenomenon within the federal court system as well as outside
6
it, in both diversity and federal question cases.'
The question, then, is not whether problems of the kind
just described would arise if a state were bifurcated between
circuits; the question is whether bifurcation would add significantly to existing problems or whether the new problems
would be different in any important way. The courts serve
essentially two functions: settling disputes and declaring the
law;' 7 bifurcation of a state between circuits might have consequences for both of these functions. Consider first the problems entailed in the settlement of disputes.
A.

Conflicts of Judgments: Inconsistent OrdersAgainst a Defendant

Whenever two courts have authority to adjudicate a single
dispute-or related disputes-the possibility exists that litigants
will invoke the jurisdiction of both courts. If more than one
lawsuit is allowed to proceed, a wide range of undesirable consequences may ensue. At the least, the parties and the courts
will be burdened with the expense and vexation of duplicative
litigation. Beyond that, the courts may reach inconsistent re'"See, e.g., Spearman v. Spearman, 482 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1973) (California law);
Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub noma.Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974) (Florida law); Waters v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 363
F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Missouri law); Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works,
241 F.2d 906 (Ist Cir. 1957) (Mississippi law).
6
See, e.g., Summers, Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity
Cases, 47 Iowa L. REV. 933 (1962); Comment, A Proposal to End the Race to the Court
House in Appeals from Federal Administrative Orders, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 166 (1968);
Comment, Forum-Shopping in the Review of NLRB Orders, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 552
(1961); Note, "Mistake" and Forum Shopping in Suits for Refund of Federal Tax, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 1244 (1966); Note, Forum Shopping in Appellate Review of FTC Cease
and Desist Orders, 13 UTAH L. REV. 316 (1968); Comment, The Choice Between State and
Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 VA. L. REv. 178 (1965). For a collection
of the extensive literature on forum shopping in federal tax cases, see Ponder,
Trial Court Litigation, 1969 So. CAL. TAx INST. 117, 118 n.l.
17 Cf the analysis of the functions of appellate courts in Hufstedler, New Blocks
for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 901 (1971). See also
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542, 550-554
(1969).
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suits in the two cases, a situation which may tend to weaken
public and professional confidence in the judicial system. Worst
of all, the judgments in the redundant lawsuits may address
conflicting commands to one or more of the litigants. As Hazard and Moskovitz put it, "This is not only a grave matter, it
is a subversion of the very basis of the legal order. It is intolerable that a legal system should come down at the point of
application to tell someone that he has orders such that he
cannot help but disobey." 18
Grave though the matter may be, it need not detain us
long at this stage of the discugsion.1 9 The prospect of repetitive litigation, actual or potential, by parties embroiled in what
is essentially a single dispute, is hardly novel in American law,
and a wide variety of mechanisms has been developed for
avoiding vexatious lawsuits and inconsistent judgments. These
mechanisms include the stay, 20 the injunction, the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel and the rules of party joinder. Under the full faith and credit clause, together with prevailing doctrines of comity, most of these mechanisms operate
across as well as within jurisdictional boundaries. There is
every reason to believe that they will be as effective in the
bifurcated state as in any other situation where two courts
have authority to adjudicate the same dispute. Indeed, some
of the more efficient mechanisms, such as the joinder rules,
may operate with fewer impediments, because limitations on
venue and personal jurisdiction are less likely to stand in the
way of comprehensive litigation within a state than across state
21
lines.
B. Conflicts of Legal Rules
As long as a legal question remains unresolved by a tribunal whose decision is binding on all who may be affected,
"8Hazard & Moskovitz, An Historical and Critical Analysis of Interpleader, 52 CAL.
L. REV. 706, 752 (1964).
19For a discussion of the mechanisms for resolving or mitigating these problems,
see text accompanying notes 208-81 infra.
20 In the federal system, the stay is used rather than the plea in abatement. See
D. LoUISELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 680 (3d ed. 1973).
21 The joinder rules are efficient in that they come into play during the initial
litigation, when it is likely to be easiest to avoid duplicative litigation without denying
anyone a full opportunity to contest any matters which may affect his interests. By
contrast, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may require a court
to choose between minimizing litigation and affording someone the opportunity to
be heard.

1974]

DIVIDING A STATE BETWEEN FEDERAL CIRCUITS

the possibility exists that conflicting rules of law will be applied
by different courts. Three undesirable consequences result.
First, some persons will be placed in a position of uncertainty
about which rule will be applied to their transactions. Second,
persons similarly situated in all legally relevant respects may
be treated differently simply because they are subject to the
jurisdiction of a different court. 22 Finally, litigants with access
to more than one court may "shop around" for the forum
which they believe will apply a rule more favorable to their
case.
In recent years the problem of "conflict in the circuits"
has aroused widespread concern among practitioners and
judges. As Dean Griswold has observed, however, "conflicts"
are no more than the visible, and often fortuitous, manifestations of a problem that is somewhat subtler and of broader
dimensions; the absence of an authoritative, binding resolution
of questions of law.2 3 In Griswold's words, "it takes at least two
decisions to make a conflict, and the law of the country remains
uncertain until the conflict is finally made and then eventually
resolved. 2 4 Indeed, in some respects this kind of uncertainty
may be worse than a 'clear conflict between circuits: litigants
with nationwide interests, such as the federal government, may
be prompted to pursue multiple lawsuits in carefully chosen
forums, partly in the hope of creating conflicts which will bring
25
about Supreme Court review.
22 One may argue that it begs the question to say that persons subject to the
jurisdiction of different courts are "similarly situated in all legally relevant respects."
Why is the fact that otherwise similar transactions are subject to the jurisdiction of
different courts not "legally relevant"? With respect to issues of federal law, the
answer is that from the very nature of the federal system, federal jurisprudence
comprises a single body of law which, in theory at least, should be applied uniformly
to all transactions within its purview. When issues of state law are involved, the analysis will be more complex. See text accompanying notes 315-42 infra.

23Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 2, 1973, at 27-31 (testimony of Dean Griswold) [hereinafter
cited as Commission Hearings, with place and date].
24 Griswold, The Supreme Court's Caseload: Civil Rights and Other Problems, 1973
U. ILL. L.F. 615, 630.
25Cf Commission Hearings, supra note 23, Washington, D.C., Aug. 2, 1973, at 2829, 70 (testimony of Dean Griswold); P. Carrington & M. Rosenberg, A PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM 11 (Aug. 2, 1973)
(working paper filed with the Commission). The problem is well summarized by Judge
Hufstedler:
The lack of reasonably prompt definitive answers to issues of national concern
can thwart rational public and private planning, whether the subject is the
location or design of a new dam or a factory, the licensing of a communica-
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If the gravamen of the problem is the absence of an authoritative decision, the analysis appropriately begins by identifying the organ of government whose voice is not heard by
those who depend on it for guidance. Federal courts decide
two kinds of issues: issues of federal law and issues of state
law. The Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of federal
decisional law; the state courts, of state decisional law. The
problems may therefore be divided into those involving issues
of federal law and those involving issues of state law.
1. State Law Issues
Federal courts adjudicate state law issues in a variety of
contexts. The consequences of dividing a state between circuits
are likely to depend on the reason why a federal court is deciding a question of state law.
a. Diversity Cases
In a diversity case federal courts are bound, under Erie2 6 and
its progeny, to follow state decisional law on substantive issues. 27 When state law is clear, the existence of two circuits
within a state should pose no problems, because judges in both
circuits would be obliged to follow that law. Only when the
state's decisional law is unclear will the federal courts have
some latitude in interpreting it, and only then will the possibility of conflicting decisions by the two courts of appeals exist.
Detailed empirical research would be required to determine
how often California law is unclear and how much latitude
would thereby be created for federal courts in diversity cases.
It would then be necessary to make a judgment about how
often the possibility of divergent interpretations would actually
be realized. No one can speak with certainty, but there is
strong reason to conclude that the predictions of frequent
tions facility, or the budgeting of funds to meet demands for social services,
or managing the secur'ities markets. Moreover, the lack of certitude excessively
breeds litigation, particularly when the litigants have both the motivation and
the power to renew lost battles in forum after forum.
Hufstedler, Courtship and Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545, 547 (1974).
26 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27
See generally H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 713-49 (2d ed. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler 1973). This
is, of course, an oversimplification of the Erie rule, but it suffices for present purposes.
See D. LoUISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 20, at 568-69.
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conflicts made by some witnesses at the Commission's West
Coast hearings will not be borne out.
Even today, with no circuit boundaries bifurcating a state,
conflicting federal decisions on points of state law in diversity
cases are by no means impossible. In states containing more
than pne federal judicial district, state law may be interpreted
differently in different districts, and if the decisions are not
28
appealed, or are not appealable, the conflicts may persist.
Such conflicts are obviously not desirable, but the bench and
bar manage to live with them, in part because they occur so
infrequently. 2 9 Several considerations suggest that they will be
neither more numerous nor more troublesome when the decisions of the district courts can be appealed to two courts of appeals rather than one.
If the doubtful issue is one which arises frequently in suits
brought in the federal courts, the same issue is likely to arise
in state-court litigation as well, thereby giving the state courts
28

For instance, in September 1964, the District Courts for the Eastern and West-

ern Districts of Pennsylvania handed down inconsistent decisions interpreting a
Pennsylvania statute providing for substituted service on foreign corporations. The
issue was not resolved by the Third Circuit until January 1967 (at which time the
Pennsylvania courts had still not ruled authoritatively on the question). Hartley v.
Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 379 F.2d 354, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1967).
See also Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (M.D. Pa. 1973)
(Pennsylvania district courts differ in "predictions" of Pennsylvania law on right of
contribution).
In addition, at the appellate level, a court of appeals may be required by choice
of law rules to apply the law of a state outside its circuit. See Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612 (1964). Indeed, as the Commission nbtes, any federal court may be
called upon to interpret California law. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 238.
Of course, there is a difference between having California law interpreted by the
First and Ninth Circuits, as may happen today, and having it interpreted by two circuits both having jurisdiction within the state, as might happen under a bifurcation
of the state. California practitioners might feel justified in ignoring a First Circuit
decision interpreting California law; they could hardly ignore a decision by a court
of appeals sitting in California and composed in part of California judges. Nevertheless, both situations may result in differential treatment and, to a lesser extent, in
opportunities for forum shopping. Cf. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated sub nora. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974) (Second Circuit panel
divided over interpretation of Florida law; Kaufman, J., dissenting, urged resort to
certification procedure) (criticized in 87 HARV. L. REv. 675, 684-86 (1974)); Waters
v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 684, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (D.C. Circuit engages
in independent examination of Missouri law, and states that although the Eighth
Circuit's views are "entitled to weight," the law of Missouri can be authoritatively
gathered only from Missouri decisions).
29 Dean Griswold, acknowledging that there could be different interpretations
of state law by the two circuits, said that "[t]hat does not seem to me any more important than [that] there could be two interpretations of the Uniform Commercial Code
by the Third Circuit and the Fourth Circuit. I do not think that is terribly important."
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an opportunity to rule authoritatively on it. 30 On the other
hand, if the issue is one which never comes before the state
courts, the odds are that the federal courts will not confront it
frequently either. It is always possible that there are some
issues of state law that arise frequently in diversity cases but
that for some reason are seldom adjudicated in the state courts;
but it hardly seems likely that these are common. 31 A more
plausible complication arises out of the fact that when the California courts of appeals-the intermediate state appellate courts
-take different views on an issue of state law, some time may
elapse before the state supreme court resolves the question
authoritatively. Until the supreme court acts, the federal courts
have two lines of authority to follow; in such circumstances
the two circuits might opt for different rules. It is not at all
clear, however, that this development would create any more
uncertainty for litigants than the underlying conflict among
the California courts. Indeed, the federal courts might simply
sitting .in the
follow the decision of the state appellate court
32
federal district where the federal case was tried.
Commission Hearings, supra note 23, Washington, D.C., Aug. 3, 1973, at 71 (testimony
Griswold).
of Dean
3
Judge James R. Browning of the Ninth Circuit remarked at the Commission's
hearings, "there is a time lag between the time Circuit P and Circuit Q are making
these rulings, and it is inconceivable to me that either the Supreme Court in California
or the five District Courts of Appeal would not by that time have decided the question
Commission Hearings, supra note 23,
one way or another, if it was of any moment ....
San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30, 1973, at 71 (testimony of Judge Browning). The designations P and Q correspond to the proposed Twelfth and Ninth Circuits, respectively.
31 Judge Ben C. Duniway of the Ninth Circuit, addressing himself to this matter,
commented, "California has a very highly developed jurisprudence, both common
law and statutory, and it is very seldom indeed that there would be differences between circuits as to what the law of California is." Statement of Hon. Ben. C. Duniway
to the Commission, Aug. 30, 1973. Judge Browning expressed the same view: "I am
not impressed . . . that it arises very often, that there is an unsettled question that
you really [can] go two ways on, or that [the same question] comes up more than once
over a short span of time." Commission Hearings, supra note 23, San Francisco, Cal.,
Aug. 30, 1973, at 70.
32 Under the latitudinarian rule followed by the Sixth Circuit in Lee Shops, Inc.
v. Schatten-Cyprus Co., 350 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 980 (1966),
and now abandoned by the Eighth Circuit in Luke v. American Family Mut. Ihs. Co.,
476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973), it is conceivable that a
federal court of appeals today could affirm two district court rulings that reach opposite conclusions on an issue of state law. That is, if the test is whether the district court
reached a "permissible" conclusion, 350 F.2d at 17, the court of appeals could hold
that more than one conclusion is "permissible." This is unlikely, of course; nor has
the Sixth Circuit's rule found favor among commentators. See IA J. MOORE, FEDERAL
0.309, at 183 (1973 Cum. Supp.); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
PRACTICE
FEDERAL COURTS,

§ 58, at 240-41 (2d ed. 1970).
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The crucial consideration is that the federal courts of appeals have no great interest in promulgating rules of state law
to be applied in diversity cases. 33 Telling evidence of this attitude is found in the strong and virtually controlling weight
which the courts of appeals regularly give to the determinations of state law made by district judges in diversity cases
which come up on appeal. In this regard the Ninth Circuit
probably goes further than some of the other circuits. 34 The
court has stated repeatedly that a district judge's interpretation
of the law of the state where he sits " 'will be accepted on
review unless shown to be clearly wrong,' 35 particularly if the
highest state court has not passed on the matter."3 6 When an
appellate court has so consistently deferred to the views of
subordinate trial courts on a particular kind of issue, there is
every reason to believe that two courts inheriting its precedents, and, for the immediate future, its judges, would give
the same deference, if not more, to the decision of an appellate court of equal stature and identical patrimony. Thus, if
one of the new circuits adjudicates a point of California law
on which there has been "no clear exposition of the controlling
principle by the highest court of the . .. state,' 3 7 the other cir38
cuit would probably follow that decision.
In light of all these considerations, it is doubtful that the
evils of uncertainty and differential treatment would be significantly more widespread if state law issues in diversity cases
could be brought before two courts of appeals and the state
courts rather than one court of appeals and the state courts.
Nor is bifurcation likely to lead to an upsurge in forum shopping, since the two courts of appeals would seldom be per33 As Judge Browning (consciously or unconsciously paraphrasing Professor Henry
Higgins) put it, "They don't really care in a Federal Court of Appeals what the California law is, just so they have a rule to follow." Commission Hearings, supra note 23,
San 3Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30, 1973, at 70 (testimony of Judge Browning).
4 See IA J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309 (1973 Cum. Supp.); C. WRIGHT,
supra note 32, at 240-41.
35 Owens v. White, 380 F.2d 310, 315 (9th Cir. 1967) (emphasis supplied by Ely, J.,

in quoting Bellon v. Heinzig, 347 F.2d 4, 6 n.3 (9th Cir. 1965)).
3( Douglas v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 469 F.2d 453, 455 (9th Cir. 1972).
37 Insurance Co. of N. America v. Thompson, 381 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1967).
38 It is also possible that the two courts of appeals would differ, not on the interpretation of state law, but on the question whether a particular issue is properly to
be decided according to state or federal standards. The Supreme Court's decision

in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), has sharply limited the area for conflicting
views on that question. See D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 20, at 566-69; ef.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 245-47.
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ceived as having views of state law that were sufficiently different to make one preferable to the other on that ground. In
addition, venue rules will often deny the litigant a choice be3 9
tween the two circuits within the state.
b. Cases in Which the Interpretationof State Law Is
Intertwined with Federal Questions
State law issues are often raised in cases involving the
enforcement of federal rights and the operation of federal
statutory programs. Two broad categories of cases can be discerned: those in which rights and remedies under federal law
are made by statute or judicial decision to depend on state
law; and those in which a state statute or administrative regulation is challenged as repugnant to the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.
(i)

Federal Rights Dependent on State Law

In many situations, as a result of legislation or judicial
decision, federal legal consequences turn upon a characterization furnished by state law, 40 or on a legal rule defined by the
state. 4 1 For instance, federal tax liability may depend on state
trust law; 42 state statutes of limitations may be applied in suits
brought to enforce a right created by federal law. 43 Numerous
other examples might be adduced. 44 Although cases raising
such issues resemble diversity cases in many important respects, considerations not present in diversity litigation may
give rise to additional problems in the split-state context.
First, the state law issues which are relevant to the interpretation of federal law may be, unlike those involved in diversity cases, issues which the state courts may not often have
occasion to decide. 45 If this is so, the extent to which people
3"See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970).
11 See generally H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 768-79.
4' Id. 825-29.
42 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
43 See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
44 See R. CRAMTON & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 829-35 (1968); H. HART &
H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 491-94.
4' For instance, the extent and incidence of federal taxes will often turn on the
interpretation given wills and trust instruments under state law. The state law issues
may have no substantive importance for anyone outside of their federal tax consequences, with the result that they may never be passed on by the state's highest court.
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experience uncertainty in the planning of their affairs will
depend on whether they perceive a tendency on the part of
the courts of appeals to disagree on the points of state law
which come before them in federal question cases. Similar considerations would bear on the likelihood of forum shopping.
As with diversity cases, however, it would seem likely that the
second court to decide a state law issue would feel a strong tendency to follow the decision of the first, particularly in the
absence of a resolving mechanism.
Second, some persons may regard disparity of treatment
in this kind of case as more serious than disparity in either
diversity cases or cases in which the issues are purely federal.
In this view, it is bad enough that federal law may mean one
thing in San Francisco and another in Chicago; it is somehow
worse when the federal legal system, having decided to incorporate state law, cannot decide what that state law is. Differential treatment with regard to issues involving both state and
federal law is, however, no more of an affront to the principle
of uniformity than differential treatment in private federal
question litigation where state law is not involved. Such disparity may of course exist whether or not states are bifurcated. 4 6
Finally, when issues of state law arise in the context of
federal question adjudication, federal courts may have somewhat greater leeway in determining 47 and applying 48 the state
rule than in diversity cases. As Professor Mishkin puts it, in
cases where state law governs because of a federal decision to
"incorporate" a state rule, 49 "there remains a freedom . . . to
In this situation, under Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), the
federal courts need not follow the decisions of the lower state courts, but may make
their own determination of state law. See Ufford, Bosch and Beyond, 60 A.B.A.J. 334
(1974). The potential for conflict is thus greater (in theory) than in cases such as
those arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970), in which
recovery turns on the application of state doctrines of respondeat superior, see Williams

v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (mem.), as to which there is likely to be no dearth
of state court precedents. But see notes 48-50 infra & accompanying text.
46 Indeed, conflicts involving issues of mixed federal and state law may arise
even today in tax litigation, because "under the present system, some taxpayers in

California will have the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit making the appellate

decision in their case and other taxpayers will have the Court of Claims making the
appellate decision in their case." Hearings on S. 1973-S. 1979 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 401-02 (1969).
47 Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw", 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 808-10 (1957).
48
Id. 804-06.
49See id. 802; H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 768.
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control the extent and methods of that adoption which is not
present when a determination has been made that state law
will apply because the court has no competence to do otherwise." 50 The result is that the federal courts, no longer sitting,
"in effect, [as] only another court of the State, '5 1 may perceive
their role as including a greater responsibility for making an
independent judgment about the "sounder" rule of law. 52 Suppose that a decision by a federal court in either the Ninth or
the Twelfth Circuit stands, in the absence of clear state court
precedents, as the best available evidence of what California
law is. 5 3 In a diversity case, a federal court in the other circuit
might well be content to follow the decision of its sister court
"unless satisfied that the prior decision [was] clearly erroneous." 54 On the other hand, the argument goes, if state law
governed as a matter of federal incorporation, the second
court might reject the earlier decision if it thought that a different result was "sounder," even though it would not deem the
prior holding "clearly erroneous."
50 Mishkin, supra note 47, at 804.
51Guaranty Trust Co., v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
52 Cf Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 345-46 (D. Mass. 1951) (Wyzanski, J.);
H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 768-69; Corbin, The Laws of the Several
States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 775-76 (1941).
53 In the present context, it would probably not make much difference whether
the federal precedent is a decision by one of the two courts of appeals or by a district
court sitting in California, because other federal courts give special weight to determinations of state law made by a federal trial judge drawn from the bar of the state
and experienced in its law. See Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015,
1019 n.6 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973), & authorities cited, esp. Minnesota
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 377 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1967). A California district
judge would of course be drawn from the California bar; on the courts of appeals,
any panel would probably include at least one and often two judges appointed from
California.
54 Mitchell v. Hygrade Water & Soda Co., 285 F.2d 362, 267 (8th Cir. 1960).
Curiously, the quoted standard was applied in a case involving an issue of federal
law (interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970)). The
court stated, "Recognizing that we are not bound by the opinion of the court of
appeals of another Circuit, we have accorded the instant appeals independent consideration, having in mind, however, that in the interest of uniformity, a court of
appeals is not justified in refusing to follow the decision of another court of appeals
unless satisfied that the prior decision is clearly erroneous." Id. This policy has often
found expression in Eighth Circuit opinions. Compare Jaben v. United States, 333
F.2d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 214 (1965) with United States v. Eddy Bros.,
Inc., 291 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1961) (Eighth Circuit found "impelling and cogent
reasons" not to follow Ninth Circuit decision). It does not appear to be followed by
any other circuit. If such a standard is appropriate to issues of federal law (which it
probably is not, see Hufstedler, supra note 25, at 546), it would afortiori be appropriate
when issues of state law are involved.
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Even if one accepts the relevance of this analysis, 55 the
question remains whether the added measure of freedom it
envisages could be expected to result in a higher incidence of
conflicts between the circuits on issues of state law. The short
answer is that it could not. Nor should the other differences
between the two kinds of cases be exaggerated. Whether state
' 56
law is applied "of its own force or by way of incorporation,
it remains state law. Professor Mishkin ends by urging that,
even in the federal question context, the task of ascertaining
and applying the state law should be left largely "to the integrity and judgment of . . . lower court judges" 57-exactly what
the Ninth Circuit has been doing in diversity cases. 58 As suggested earlier, 59 this approach bespeaks deference rather than
pride of opinion on the part of the courts of appeals.
When Acting Attorney General Robert H. Bork expressed
a generalized 'concern over the danger of conflicting interpretations of state law if California were divided between two circuits, 60 Judge Ben C. Duniway of the Ninth Circuit replied
tartly that the problem belonged in the category of "things
that go bump in the night."'6 ' In his twelve years on the court,
he said, he had "never known of a case in which two district
courts in California have disagreed about what the law of Cal55 In discussing "the scope and techniques of adoption" appropriate for the
incorporation context, Mishkin, supra note 47, at 804, Professor Mishkin emphasizes
the importance of insuring that the state rule applied in a particular case is "entirely
consistent with federal objectives." Id. 806; see id. 805, 807. This leads him to the
conclusion that federal courts need not adhere to idiosyncrasies of state law, see, e.g.,
id. 805-06, but it says nothing about the appropriate attitude for a federal court in
regard to the state law rules followed by another federal court in a similar context.
In particular, in exploring "the techniques to be applied for ascertaining what the
local rule is on a given issue," id. 808, Professor Mishkin addresses himself to the
problem which faces a federal court when the only available state precedent is "quite
old, or distinguishable, or of a lower court (or a combination of these)." He has no
occasion to consider how the contours of the problem might be altered by the existence
of a recent decision on the point by anotherfederal court. It would be quite consistent
with Professor Mishkin's analysis to say that the second court should accord great
deference to the earlier federal decision.
56
Id. 803.
57
d. 809-10.
"I See notes 34-37 supra & accompanying text.
'9 Text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
60 Letter from Acting Attorney General Robert H. Bork to Senator Roman L.
Hruska, Dec. 4, 1973, on file at the Commission.
61 Letter from Judge Ben C. Duniway to Attorney General William ]3. Saxbe,
Feb. 8, 1974, on file at the Commission. The full passage deserves quotation:
With the greatest respect for Mr. Bork, the fears expressed in his letter
remind me of the ancient Scottish prayer which goes: "From ghoulies and
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ifornia is, so that [the court of appeals] had to reconcile the
difference.

' 62

He continued:

If there should be... a conflict between district courts,
it seems to me almost inconceivable that the two circuits which deal with the laws of California would
continue such a conflict. If one of them first decided
the question, the other would almost surely follow its
lead .... I think that the last thing the two circuits...

would want to do would be to create or preserve a
conflict between them as to what the law of California
is.63

(ii)

Construction of State Laws in Litigation Challenging
Their Validity on Federal Grounds
When a litigant challenges the validity of a state law on
federal grounds, the merits of the federal claim may depend
on how the state law is to be construed. Often no authoritative
construction by the state courts is available. It is therefore possible that two courts of appeals, adjudicating parallel challenges
to a state law, might reach different conclusions because of
their differing interpretations of the state law in question. As
a result, the law might be held valid in one circuit but struck
down in the other.6 4 Uncertainty and disparity of treatment
would be the probable results.
This kind of conflict is certainly undesirable, but the possibility of its occurrence should not be regarded as a significant
obstacle to the Commission's proposal. Under the .Pullman
abstention doctrine, 65 "when confronted with issues of constitutional dimension which implicate or depend upon unsettled
questions of state law, a federal court ought to abstain and stay
its proceedings until those state law questions are definitively
resolved" by the state courts. 66 Pullman-type abstention is ordinarily appropriate whenever two criteria are met: the state law
ghosties and long-leggity beasties and things that go bump in the night,
Good Lord deliver us." Based upon my experience of more than twelve years
as a member of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, I think that the
problems that Mr. Bork foresees are in the category of "things that go bump

in
the night." They are not real.
62

1d.
63Id.
64 Another possibility is that the state law would be upheld in both circuits, but
on the basis of different constructions of the law.

6'Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
6 Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574 (1973).
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is "open to a variety of constructions,'

67

and the uncertainty

is such "that construction by the state court might obviate the
need for (or at least help to limit) decision of the federal constitutional question. '68 If a state law is so ambiguous that two
federal courts called upon to adjudicate its validity under federal law might give the statute different interpretations, that
same ambiguity is likely to require abstention by both federal
courts under the Pullman doctrine.
69
Abstention, however, may not always be appropriate;
moreover, two federal courts may disagree about the applicability of the doctrine, for its scope is by no means clear.7 0 In
either situation, the case begins to look very much like those in
which the only issue is whether the state law, as construed, is
to be struck down on federal grounds. The problems raised by
71
such cases will be considered in detail later in this Article.
2. Issues of Federal Law
If the judicial districts in California are allocated between
two circuits, the two courts of appeals will sometimes differ
in their interpretation of federal law. Even if only one of the
courts has ruled on a particular issue, persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the other court may experience uncertainty
about what rule of law will be applied to their transactions. In
theory, the Supreme Court exists for the purpose, among
others, of resolving issues of federal law in a manner that will
be binding throughout the federal court system. In practice,
however, the Court leaves many such issues unresolved; indeed, it may be that the Court cannot do otherwise if it is to
perform its other functions.7 2 Consequently, on many issues
of federal law the most authoritative resolution that can be
obtained today is one that is binding only throughout a circuit. 73 For Californians affected by litigation involving issues

of federal law, the division of the state between two circuits
67 Mishkin, A General View of FederalJurisdiction, 60 F.R.D. 282, 294 (1972).
68 H. HART & H. WECHSLER supra note 27, at 991; see Note, Federal-QuestionAb-

stention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604, 617-19
(1967).
69 See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579-80 (1973).
7' See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 980-1050.

7' See text accompanying notes 101-207 infra.
'72 See STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, REPORT, 57 F.R.D
573, 578 (1972) [hereinafter cited as STUDY GROUP]; Griswold, supra note 24, at 17-19.
73 Testimony at the Commission's West Coast hearings suggested that attorneys
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appears to raise all the problems of differential treatment,
uncertainty, and forum shopping that result from the absence
of authoritative decisions. The crucial question is whether the
problems would be different from or more troublesome than
those raised by inter-circuit conflicts today.
Consider first differential treatment. If the Commission's
plan is enacted, a particular transaction might be held to produce ordinary income for a taxpayer in San Francisco, while
a taxpayer in Los Angeles might be permitted to claim a capital
gain on identical facts. Certainly it seems unfair, and even
subversive of the principle of a national law, that the Internal
Revenue Code should mean one thing in San Francisco and
another in Los Angeles. But is it any worse than according
different treatment to taxpayers in San Francisco and Chicago?
To be sure, the intrastate conflict may be more visible, or visible to more people, but if the issue is even-handed treatment
in national law, it is hard to see what difference state boundaries make when circuits disagree.
The problem of forum shopping is more complex.74 At the
outset, it is important to isolate the particular class of forum
shopping decisions that concerns us here. Suppose that after
the Commission's plan is enacted, an attorney having the option of laying venue in the Northern District of California in
the new Ninth Circuit, or in the Central District in the Twelfth,
chooses the Northern District. His selection would not necessarily indicate that he is choosing between circuits. He might
prefer the trial judges of the Northern District, or the dockets
there might be less crowded, or the Northern District might
be more convenient in the context of his other practice. Nor
would all circuit shopping between the Ninth and the Twelfth
fall within the category of split-state forum shopping; one
would have to exclude, for instance, a case in which counsel
exercised a choice between the Southern District of California,
in the Twelfth, and the District of Oregon, in the new Ninth.
sometimes have difficulty securing a court of appeals ruling that will in fact be followed in the next case to come up in the circuit. See text accompanying notes 81-83
infra. Like the other circuits, however, the court maintains that a panel decision is
binding on other panels unless it is overruled by the court en banc. See Note, En Banc
Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 563, 582 n.120 (1965)
(compiling circuit rules requiring adherence to panel decisions).
"' The term forum shopping is used here in a literal sense. That is,. our concern
is with the process of considering alternative forums, irrespective of whether the
attorney ultimately brings suit in a forum other than the "natural" one.
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The issue here involves only those cases in which an attorney
the purpose of
might shop among districts in California for
75
bringing his suit in one circuit or the other.
76
How often forum shopping of this kind would occur
and how seriously it would be regarded by the public and the
bar are questions which lend themselves more to speculation
than to empirical research. Nevertheless, a few a priori observations are suggested by earlier inquiries into forum shopping.7 7 First, most private-law litigation will have, from the
point of view of the potential forum shopper, a natural forum
plaintiff's district, perhaps, or the district where the
-the
events in dispute took place, or the district where the attorney
conducts most of his practice. Second, as suggested above,
even if the attorney exercises a choice between two districts
in the same state but in different circuits, he may do so for
reasons unrelated to the circuit difference. Third, even when
the attorney believes or hopes that the "other" circuit will follow a rule of law more favorable to his case, he may not necessarily give serious consideration to litigating there. How clear
a conflict, or how strong a perception of different attitudes,
would be required before an attorney would file a case in a
forum other than the natural one, is a question not easily
answered.7 8 Certainly the variables will be numerous, including
the stakes for the client, the perceived importance of the rule
7. This proposition must be qualified in one respect. Under rules
of jurisdiction
and venue, a Los Angeles litigant might have the option to bring his suit in Oregon,
but not in the Northern District of California. If, for some reason, he wanted to get
his case into the circuit which included San Francisco, he could do so by laying venue
in Oregon. While this can be considered a species of divided-state forum shopping,
it is a rather implausible one; only the hypothesized motivation makes the forum
shopping decision any different from what it would be if all of California were
placed in the Twelfth Circuit, with Oregon in the new Ninth.
7' We need not pause to inquire in how many cases split-state forum shopping
would be a theoretical possibility. In. California, the maximum number might be the
number of cases which, under the rules of jurisdiction and venue, could be brought
in either of the northern districts and in one or both of the southern districts. By
examining the records in a random sample of cases brought in the federal district
courts in California, it might be possible to determine the order of magnitude of this
class of cases. Such an analysis, however, would not take into account the structuring
of transactions so as to bring them within the orbit of one circuit rather than another;
that species of forum shopping would probably be impossible to measure even on a
theoretical basis.
77 See note 16 supra.
71Similar considerations will come into play when the question for the lawyer and
his client is not where to bring litigation, but whether to structure a transaction so that
its consequences will be controlled by the law of one circuit rather than another.
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of law to be applied, and the inconvenience of trying a case
79
outside the attorney's home district.
The considerations discussed thus far are ones which
.might come into play in any forum shopping decision. Two
considerations unique to the split-state situation deserve mention. First, an attorney who has an opportunity to shop among
circuits may be more likely to take advantage of that opportunity if he can do so without going out of state. He would
probably feel more familiar with the law and procedure; he
would be less likely to feel a need to hire local counsel. Second,
conflicts between circuits may be more visible when both circuits encompass districts within the attorney's state; attorneys
might see forum shopping possibilities which would not occur
to them unless they were compelled to be aware of the other
circuit's decisions.
How much effect these factors might have on forum shopping is a matter of speculation. In this connection, it is worth
noting that conflicts exist even today within circuits. At the
district court level, conflicting interpretations of federal law
may persist over a substantial period of time, especially on
issues seldom reviewed by the courts of appeals. For instance,
the district courts in the Third Circuit differed for many years
over the question whether, under the Federal Rules, liability
insurance coverage is subject to discovery in negligence actions. 0 At the court of appeals level, different panels may take
different approaches to federal law issues, distinguishing apparently conflicting decisions of other panels on grounds that
are not persuasive to the bar or to other courts. A series of
"Two recent studies of forum shopping in appeals from administrative agencies
suggest that a wide variety of considerations militate against extensive forum shopping for the purpose of obtaining a more favorable rule of law. See Comment, ForumShopping in the Review of NLRB Orders, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 552 (1961); Note, ForumShopping in Appellate Review of FTC Cease and Desist Orders, 13 UTAH L. REv. 316,
329-34 (1968). The courts themselves tend to be unsympathetic to forum shopping.
See, e.g., H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 928 (1963); Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d 699, 709 (4th Cir. 1956). An
attorney, recognizing the possibility of incurring the court's hostility, might refrain
from bringing a case in a forum with which it has only minimal connections. For
a case in which a litigant's effort to get his case into a more favorable forum boomeranged, see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 1965).
Sometimes courts utilize transfer mechanisms in order to frustrate blatant forum
shopping. See, e.g., Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1973).
"0Compare Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962), hnd McClure
v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952) with Rosenberger v. Vallejo, 30 F.R.D.
352 (W.D. Pa. 1962). and Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64 (D.N.J. 1961).
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Selective Service cases in the Ninth Circuit has been interpreted along these lines. 8 ' Indeed, Dean Erwin N. Griswold, who
as Solicitor General regularly reviewed government agencies'
petitions for en banc hearings, concluded that the Ninth Circuit generally "seems to have no feeling for intra-circuit harmony. ' 82 The judges on one panel would endeavor to do
justice in the case as it appeared to them; ten days later,
another panel might decide essentially the same question the
83
other way without any reference to the first case.
Intra-circuit conflict is in some ways a more insidious problem than inter-circuit conflict. Unpersuasive distinctions are
more likely to be invoked in an effort to suggest a nonexistent
harmony of views; the district courts are left uncertain which
path to follow; and attorneys have greater difficulty in advising clients, since the law appears to turn on the accident of
panel selection. 84 Indeed, given the logistical problems raised
by en banc hearings in large courts, 8 5 the coexistence of two
circuits within a state may actually produce less uncertainty
for the bar than the present arrangement. If Congress chooses
to divide the present Ninth Circuit, it will be because the vol8" Letter from Assistant U.S. Attorney Lawrence W. Campbell, to the Commission, Sept. 11, 1973. In United States v. Ayala, 465 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1972),
one panel affirmed a jury conviction for draft evasion where the registrant failed
to notify his selective service board that he was no longer under active orthodontic
treatment, but in United States v. Deep, No. 72-1623 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 1973), withdrawn
for rehearing (withdrawn decision published in advance sheet 483 F.2d No. 3, at 1044),
upon very similar facts, the jury conviction was reversed because the facts not reported
to the board were held "not material" to the board's decision within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970). In May 1974 Deep's conviction was affirmed by the Court
en banc, overruling the panel. 497 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1974).
82 Proposal: The Creation of a National Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 5 THE
THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1973, at 1, 5 (injerview with Erwin N. Griswold) [hereinafter
cited83as Griswold Interview].
Commission Hearings, supra note 21, Washington, D.C., Aug. 2, 1973, at 26
(testimony of Dean Griswold).
84 The president of the Washington State Bar Association expressed the point
this way: "[G]iven a choice between an increase in inter-circuit conflicts and [an
increase in] intra-circuit conflicts, I think we would all conclude that the inter-circuit
conflict was the lesser of the two evils. I think it's hell not to be able to find a home
in our own circuit court." Commission Hearings,supra note 23, Seattle, Wash., Aug. 28,
1973, at 35 (testimony of C. Cone, Esq.). See id., San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30, 1973,
at 29 (testimony of Judge Schnacke); cf. Harris v. Estelle, 487 F.2d 1293, 1297 (5th
Cir. 1974): "The cases in this circuit on the question are conflicting in result and
none reason the basis for their differing dispositions. . . . In the absence of any
single clear rule in this circuit, we are free to dispose of the instant case in a manner
which best reconciles the conflicting policy interests which it presents."
8" See Note, supra note 73, at 574-77; Commission Hearings, supra note 23, Seattle,
Wash., Aug. 28, 1973, at 116 (testimony of Judge Wright).
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ume of litigation is thought to be too large to be successfully
managed in any other way; and it is the large undivided circuit
which has the greatest difficulty in avoiding intra-circuit conflict. Among other problems, the judges in a large circuit can
communicate with each other less frequently and are less able
to keep abreast of each other's opinions than might be desirable. In the bifurcated state, on the other hand, occasional
uncertainties as to which circuit's law will be applied to a particular transaction or controversy may well be outweighed by
86
greater certainty as to the law within each circuit.
Many of the problems of federal law adjudication which
may be created by the division of California between circuits
are inherent in any system in which legal rules are promulgated by more than one court. In recent years, scholars, judges,
and legislators have been working to devise mechanisms to
assure authoritative resolution of issues of federal law on a
nationwide basis, without requiring the Supreme Court to
decide the less important points of federal law. 87 Two prominent organizations have now endorsed proposals for tribunals
88
explicitly designed to resolve conflicts among the circuits.
The development of new structures for this purpose may
render unnecessary any attempt to devise special mechanisms
for a divided California-at least where private law issues are
concerned.
C. Special Problems of PrisonerLitigation
Allocation of the judicial districts of California between
the Ninth and the Twelfth Circuits could create especially
86 With respect to some kinds of federal law issues, it may not make much difference whether there are two circuits or only one. Most cases are decided by three
judge panels, with virtually no possibility of en banc rehearings. When the issue
is, for instance, whether an administrative agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, see Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), or whether a payment by an employer to the widow
of an employee is to be treated as taxable compensation or as a tax-free gift, see
Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962), the appellate decision will
probably depend less on the precedents of the circuit than on the attitudes of the
individual judges; different panels are equally likely to reach different conclusions
whether or not the judges are members of the same court. See Friendly, Averting
the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 654 (1974); cf. Harris v.
Estelle, 487 F.2d 1293, 1.297 (5th Cir. 1974).
87 See STUDY GROUP, supra note 72.
88
See ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVING THE FEDERAL INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE SYSTEM (1974) [hereinafter cited
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troublesome opportunities for forum shopping in litigation
initiated by state prisoners. Such litigation constituted ten percent of the Ninth Circuit's total caseload in fiscal 1973.89
Under section 2241(d), 90 added to the habeas corpus statute in 1966, a California state prisoner has the option of filing
an application for habeas corpus either in the district where
he is confined or in the district where he was convicted and
sentenced. 91 The district court chosen by the prisoner then
has the discretion to transfer the application to the other of
those two districts for hearing and determination. Obviously,
section 2241(d) permits forum shopping by prisoners today.
The question is whether forum shopping would be more widespread if the prisoner could shop not only between districts
but also between circuits, and if so, whether the statute should
be amended to restrict either the prisoner's options or the
92
district court's discretion.
As long as issues of criminal law, criminal procedure, prison discipline, and the scope of collateral attack remain unresolved by the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals will be,
as a practical matter, the courts of last resort on such questions,
and will differ in their answers. It seems probable, then, that
when two courts of appeals exercise jurisdiction within a single
state, the two courts will differ on at least some issues relating
to criminal law, with the result that at least some prisoners
will find it to their advantage to bring their applications in
one circuit rather than another. If the present statute is retained, therefore, forum shopping by state prisoners will probably increase. As with federal questions generally, the magas ADVISORY COUNCIL]; SPECIAL COMM. ON COORDINATION OF JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT (1974) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL COMMITTEE]; see also Griswold Interview, supra note 82, at 1.

"9See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, Tables B-3 & B-7.
90 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1970).
91 The provision applies only to persons "in custody under the judgment and
sentence of a state court of a state which contains two or more federal judicial districts ......
Until 1966, a state prisoner could bring an action for habeas corpus
only in the district where he was imprisoned. Consequently, prisoner litigation was
concentrated in the districts where state penitentiaries were located; moreover, it
was often expensive and inconvenient to hold a full hearing on a collateral attack
in a court far from the locus of the trial. The 1966 legislation was designed to remedy
these problems. See S. REP. No. 1502, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
92 There is, of course, another possibility: the prospect of extensive or uncontrolled forum shopping might be regarded as such a serious and intractable problem
that it should preclude enactment of the Commission's plan. For reasons given in
the text, this conclusion would be difficult to support.
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nitude of the increase would depend, in part, on the extent to
which the two courts were perceived as having different rules
or attitudes.
Forum shopping appears especially inequitable in litigation involving conditions within the prison rather than collateral attacks on a conviction. A state prisoner confined in the
Central District after being tried and sentenced in the Northern District9 3 could bring a habeas action in either the Ninth
or the Twelfth Circuit to seek reforms in prison conditions,
while another inmate of the same prison who had been sen95
94
tenced in the Southern District would not have that option.
Moreover, the prisoners could bring separate actions for redress of the same grievance, one in the Northern District and
the other in the Central District, with all the possibilities of
inconsistent decisions or orders inherent in such duplicative
litigation.
The transfer provision of section 2241(d) provides an
easy way to avoid conflicts and frustrate attempts at forum
shopping. In the situation described, for instance, the district
court in the sentencing district would probably exercise its
discretion to transfer the action to the district where the prison
was located. By the same token, the transfer provision could
be used to assure that collateral attacks on state convictions
are litigated in the district-and therefore the circuit-where
the prisoner was sentenced. 96 The provision is discretionary,
however, and if the Commission's realignment plan is enacted,
93 Or Eastern District.
94 Or Central District.
"5See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1970). The inequity is mitigated by the fact that
habeas actions challenging prison conditions may be brought on behalf of a class
of prisoners. See, e.g., Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th. Cir. 1972).
H6See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hammen v. Mazurkiewicz, 303 F. Supp. 629
(E.D. Pa. 1969); Laue v. Nelson, 279 F. Supp. 265 (N.D. Calif. 1968). In the latter
case the court declared:
The legislative history of [§ 2241(d)] makes clear that a district court should
transfer a petition to the district in which petitioner was convicted and
sentenced if the transferring court is of the view that an evidentiary hearing
will be necessary before final determination can be had. . . . The purpose of
this procedure is to "permit the hearing to be held by the district court for
the place of conviction, the one best able to administer full justice."
Id. at 266 (quoting 2 UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEws

2968, 2974 (1966)). Authority for such transfers is also provided by the general transfer of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1970). See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit of
Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 499 n.15 (1973); Wilkins v. Erickson, 484 F.2d 969 (8th
Cir. 1973).
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it may be desirable to amend section 2241(d) to permit the

filing of habeas applications by state prisoners in only one district. Applications challenging the proceedings resulting in

the conviction and sentence would be cognizable only in the
district where the prisoner was convicted and sentenced; appli-

cations challenging the conditions of confinement would be
cognizable only in the district where the prison is located. Such
an amendment would do no more than apply to state prisoners
the limitations that now govern litigation by prisoners in federal custody. D7 Congress has already expressed its judgment

that the proper forum for collateral attack on a federal conviction is the sentencing district, 98 while it is generally thought
that federal prisoners challenging prison practices must bring
their habeas actions in the district of confinement. 9 9 The pro-

posed venue restriction is thus consistent with the views of
Congress and the courts on the proper administration of the

habeas remedy for federal prisoners.100
D. Special Problems of Litigation Involving the Validity of
State Statutes and Practices
Judges and lawyers dubious about the desirability of allocating the judicial districts of California between circuits have
expressed particular concern over the consequences for litigation involving the validity of state statutes and other govern-

', The suggested amendment would also eliminate the possibility that a district
court, out of lack of sympathy for the rule enunciated in its own circuit, might
deliberately transfer a prisoner's application to a district in the circuit with a rule
of law less favorable (or more favorable) to the prisoner's contentions.
98 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970); see United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212-19
(1952); United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (2d
Cir. 1970).
" See, e.g., Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972); Ledesma v. United
States, 445 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1971).
100The discussion of habeas corpus in this section is obviously not exhaustive.
Other matters which may deserve exploration include the relation between habeas
corpus and actions under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), see Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); the identity of the officials who may or must be
named as respondents, see Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 1038, 1166-69 (1970); and possible opportunities for officials of the state
prison system to frustrate prisoners' rights by moving prisoners from institutions in
one circuit to institutions in the other, cf. Gomes v. Travisono, 490 F.2d 1290 (1st Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3202 (1974) (rights of prisoners prior to transfer to prison
in another state). It would be wrong, or at least premature, to minimize the possible
difficulties; at the same time, one should note that new methods of handling prisoner
complaints, now being proposed in several quarters, may moot many of them. See, e.g.,
STUDY GROUP, supra note 72, at 587-88; Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973).
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mental actions. 10 ' Would it not be possible, they ask, for a
statute to be held valid in one circuit, but invalid in the other?
Even worse, might not the courts issue conflicting judgments10 2
orders such that the defendant "cannot help but disobey"'
one of them-to a state official or administrative agency? Conflicts of this kind would justly weigh heavily against whatever
benefits might accrue from the division of California between
circuits. Analysis suggests, however, that the problems are by
no means as intractable as some observers have assumed.
1. Conflicting Orders Directed to a State Official or Agency
A variety of mechanisms, described in detail in the concluding part of this Article, 10 3 are already available to channel
lawsuits raising the same or related issues into a single court.
Either in their present form or with modifications, these mechanisms will often permit courts to avoid duplicative litigation
and thus even the possibility of inconsistent judgments. Suppose, however, that two or more lawsuits are permitted to
proceed independently, either concurrently or consecutively,
in district courts in the two circuits. Often they will reach the
same outcome; indeed, that is likely to be the rule rather than
the exception. In particular, the same outcome will result when
the relevant precedents all point in one direction; in more
difficult cases, when the second court finds the reasoning of
the first court to be persuasive; and in doubtful cases, when
the second court defers to the judgment of the first in order
to avoid a conflict. Finally, even if two actions do result in
inconsistent judgments about the validity of an agency practice,
it does not necessarily follow that the agency must violate one
order to obey the other. On the contrary, this is an extremely
improbable outcome, as the following analysis will show.
Suppose, for example, that in separate lawsuits in the two
circuits, two state parolees seek to compel the state parole
board to hold hearings before revoking their parole. The
court of appeals in the Ninth Circuit finds for the plaintiff,
'"1 See, e.g., Commission Hearings, supra note 23, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30,
1973, at 20-21 (testimony of Judge Schnacke); id. 41-42 (testimony of Judge Duniway); BAR ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, DISCUSSION RE THE COMMISSION ON
REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM 31-33 (1973). It should be noted,
however, that several witnesses found considerably less cause for alarm. See, e.g., Commission Hearings 105-07 (testimony of Professor Mishkin); notes 173, 176 infra.
102 See note 18 supra & accompanying text.
103 See text accompanying notes 209-81 & 303-76 infra.
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and orders the parole board to hold the hearings. In the
Twelfth Circuit the court upholds the board's refusal to do
so.10

4

The parole board may choose, as a matter of policy or

administrative convenience, to hold hearings for parolees
everywhere in the circuit.10 5 Or the agency might hold hearings for parolees in the Ninth Circuit but not for those in the
Twelfth. 10 6 In either event, the incongruity may be regarded
as one which the legal system can, and in other contexts does,
tolerate. As Hazard and Moskovitz put it, referring to the
example of multiple suits by passengers against a railroad following a trainwreck, "[t]he legal sovereign can . . .swallow the

incongruities of reaching contradictory decisions on identical
law and similar facts.' 0 7
Inconsistent decisions involving many other state laws or
regulations would fall within the same class. For instance, one
court might uphold a one year residency requirement for instate tuition benefits at the state university; the second court
might strike down any residency requirement in excess of six
months. The university clearly could establish a uniform sixmonth requirement, thus complying with the second ruling
without violating the first.10 8 Or suppose that one court orders
the state welfare agency to permit its clients to be accompanied
by counsel at hearings to consider a reduction in benefits,
while the other court goes further and holds that counsel must
104 A conflict among the circuits on this issue was resolved by the Supreme Court
in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
10- To be sure, in this as in many comparable situations, compliance throughout
the state with the ruling which imposes the more stringent restriction would probably cost more than compliance only within the boundaries of the circuit making
the ruling, but it would be no more costly than being forced to abide by the ruling
of a circuit embracing the entire state. If the suit resulting in the more stringent
restriction is brought as a class action on behalf of all parolees throughout the state,
see note 114 infra & accompanying text, or if an injunction with statewide effect is
granted, the effect will be exactly the same as if the order were affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit today.
106It might be argued that if the parole board grants revocation hearings to
parolees in the Ninth Circuit, but not to those in the Twelfth, the parolees in the
Twelfth are denied equal protection. If that were so, however, the same argument
could be made by a taxpayer in the Second Circuit who is denied a deduction which
the Internal Revenue Service allows to taxpayers in the Seventh under a court of
appeals decision applicable to that circuit. While such inconsistencies are unfortunate, they do not rise to the level of a denial of equal protection or, vis-a-vis the
federal government, of due process.
107 Hazard & Moskovitz, supra note 18, at 753.
10 See generally Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Compare the majority
and dissenting opinions in Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (constitutionality
of 50 day residency requirement for voting).
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be provided for indigent clients. 10 9 Again, the welfare agency
could obey both orders without difficulty. Or the court in one
circuit might hold that the state in computing AFDC benefits
may not automatically attribute the earnings of a resident minor to his or her parents, but must make an investigation in
each case to determine how much the minor is contributing
to the family's support.1 1 0 The state could comply with that
order without coming into conflict with a decision of the other
circuit upholding the automatic attribution rule.
The point of these examples is that in a variety of common situations, federal court orders directed against a state
agency may be inconsistent without being mutually exclusive.
That will be true when one court requires a particular change
in procedures and the other court finds the status quo permissible; it will be true also if the two orders are cumulative-that
is, if one goes further than the other in mandating reform.
Even decisions requiring a wide range of reforms in institutions such as prisons and mental hospitals are not likely to put
the state administrator in a position of having to disobey one
order or the other. Indeed, most federal court orders containing detailed requirements for changes in the operation and
management of prisons or mental hospitals are designed to
correct conditions in a particular institution.'
In the few cases
involving the management of the entire state prison or mental
health system, it is very unlikely that one court would order
the administrator not to engage in practices which the other
2
court had found mandated by the Constitution.'
To be sure, in some of the situations just described, the
inconsistent orders would put an administrator to a difficult
choice. Consider, for example, the litigation over residency
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 257 n.3 (1970).
"" See Reyna v. Vowell, 470 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1972).
"'See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 42 U.S.L.W. 5190, 5191 n.1 (U.S. June 26,
1974); Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 197) (Orleans Parish
Prison); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 898-904 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (state penitentiary); but cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974) (state prison system);
Sands v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (same).
112 Other pairs of orders may or may not put an agency in an impossible position, depending on the circumstances. For instance, an order by one court to spend
money to upgrade a mental institution might draw upon funds which the state
agency would otherwise spend to comply with the order of another court to provide
schooling for retarded children. This situation, however, could arise whether the
agency is subject to the jurisdiction of one circuit or two. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney,
10'
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requirements for in-state tuition benefits. If the chancellor
complies with the more restrictive six month ruling only to
the extent that he must, the university may incur administrative costs arising out of the application of different standards
at different campuses (and perhaps to different students at a
single campus); the differential treatment would also be unfair
to the individuals involved. On the other hand, if the chancellor adopts the six month requirement throughout the state,
differential treatment is avoided, but at a price: the state has
been forced to abide by the result least favorable to its contentions, and the university needlessly forfeits some revenues
from out-of-state tuition." 3
This kind of dilemma, however, is one with which the law
is familiar and for which preventive mechanisms were long
ago developed. Among these is the class action. Even today,
lawsuits challenging residency requirements, welfare agency
practices, and many other state regulations are typically brought
as class actions. 1 4 Unless particular strategic considerations
dictate otherwise, the plaintiff will sue on behalf of himself
and all others affected by the regulation, whether or not they
are within the district (or the circuit) in which the litigation
is brought. A successful suit will redound to the benefit of
members of the class in both circuits," 5 and the agency will
be forced to comply to exactly the same extent as it would if
the Ninth Circuit were to rule on the issue today. Nor is this
result an anomalous one; on the contrary, the judgment serves
precisely the function envisaged for the class suit in the early
cases. 11 6 For that matter, even if the action is not brought on
344 F. Supp. 387, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (district court orders upgrading of three state institutions for
mentally ill and retarded, warning that failure to comply with decrees could not be
justified by lack of operating funds); Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of
Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1282, 1301-04
(1973).
"3 Also, in the interim between the decisions of the two courts, the agency may
experience uncertainty about whether it will be required to follow the first court's
mandate throughout the state. This dilemma, however, is one which the agency faces
today between the time a district court renders a decision and the time the court of
appeals affirms or reverses it.
"14See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
115 See Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973); Bermudez v.
United States Dep't of Agric., 490 F.2d 718, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Advertising
Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 1956); but cf. note 196 infra.
116
See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) ("If . . .
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behalf of a class, the judgment will be binding on the defendant administrator throughout the state as long as it includes,
as it typically does, injunctive or declaratory relief against the
17
enforcement of the statute or regulation in question.'
One can, of course, hypothesize situations in which the
two courts of appeals might affirm judgments containing conflicting mandates directed against a state officer or agency.
Suppose, for instance, that a black applicant for a faculty position in the state university system brings suit in a district court
in the Ninth Circuit alleging that the university has not fulfilled its obligations under the affirmative action program of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare."" The
district court agrees, and, in accordance with circuit precedents, orders the Board of Regents to draw up a program
which has the effect of giving a preference in hiring to black
applicants. The Board of Regents complies. A suit is then filed
in a district court in the Twelfth Circuit by a white applicant
who claims that the program discriminates against him on
account of race. 119 The precedents in the Twelfth Circuit appear to support his claim.
This hypothetical example probably seems rather farfetched. The reason, as suggested earlier, is that the orders
which federal courts commonly issue against state officers do
not easily lend themselves to inconsistencies such that it is
impossible for the officer to obey both. Indeed, there are really
conflicting judgments are to be avoided all of the class must be concluded by the
decree."); Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 229-30 (1950); cf. Williams v.
Richardson, 481 F.2d 358,)361 (8th Cir. 1973); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108, 1112
(9th Cir. 1972).
"I It is clear that the binding effect of an injunction need not be, and ordinarily is not, limited to the territory of the issuing court. See, e.g., Leman v. KrentlerArnold Hinge Last 'Co., 284 U.S. 448, 451-52 (1932); Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 250 U.S. 363, 368 (1919). Complications may arise if the
day-to-day administration of a state regulation is entrusted to a local government
unit. See text accompanying notes 153.56 & note 196 infra. Under current law, of
course, actions seeking injunctive relief against the enforcement of a state statute
must be heard by a three judge district court, with direct appeal to the Supreme
Court. See notes 141-50 infra & accompanying text.
What probably bothers people most in this regard is not simply the possibility
of conflicting orders, but rather the opportunity for public issue groups to litigate
in one circuit and, if they lose, to relitigate the issue in the other circuit in the name
of plaintiffs not bound by the first decision because of inadequate notice or the
definition of the class. See notes 137-40, 158-64 infra & accompanying text.
" See 45 C.F.R. § 80.50) (1973).
'"'Cf. Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) (injunction against an "affirmative action" employment program);
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only two kinds of situations in which an agency might possibly
be caught between the demands of mutually incompatible
court orders. The first is the situation in which the two courts
order that preferences be given to different groups in the
allocation of a limited resource-for example, the state fisc or
jobs with a particular agency or places in a law school class.
The hypothetical case represents one circumstance in which
this might happen: one court's requirement of "benign" racial
discrimination gives priority to one group-members of a particular minority-while a second court's rule against discrimination of any kind gives priority to another group-those who
meet whatever non-racial criteria the state agency establishes.
Second, there are situations in which two constitutional rights
come into conflict-a fair trial and freedom of the press, property ownership and first amendment rights, free exercise of
religion and nonestablishment. Clashes of this kind probably
would not arise frequently in the context of the activities of
state administrative agencies,1 20 but the possibility does exist;
because the consequences would be grave, it is necessary to
consider how conflict might be avoided.
A crucial element is that of timing. Suppose that the plaintiff in the second action in the hypothetical example (the white
applicant) filed his complaint while the trial of the first action
was still running its course.'12 It could then be argued that he
is a person who "claims an interest relating to the subject of
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, vacated as moot, 94 S. Ct. 1704
(1974) (injunction against dual admission policy reversed).
120

One can also conjure up situations in which problems of inconsistent judg-

ments might arise even though the same agency is not initially a party to both suits.
Suppose, for example, that a district court in the Twelfth Circuit orders the Los

Angeles school district to buy buses in order to promote integration, and the order
is affirmed by the court of appeals. The state commissioner of education then issues

a ruling that school districts can no longer spend money for buses. The regulation
is attacked in the Ninth Circuit on federal constitutional grounds, but the Ninth
Circuit upholds it. The local officials under court order to buy buses are subject to
dismissal if they violate the contrary orders of the commissioner of education. Cf
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 n.5 (1968). This conflict could be avoided
by making the state commissioner of education a party to the first lawsuit. The
courts have held that where the participation of a state official might be required
to achieve the relief to which the plaintiffs would be entitled, the state officials should
be joined as defendants in a suit against local officials. See, e.g., Bradley v. School
Bd., 51 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Va. 1970). The state officials would thus be bound by the

judgment.
121 This might happen if the first court had initially issued a preliminary injunction and was hearing arguments on the question whether to make the injunction
permanent.
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the [first] action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may . . . leave [the Board of Regents]
subject to a substantial risk of incurring . . . inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest,"'122 so that under rule
nineteen the court in the first action would be required, upon
1 23
motion by the defendant, to join the second-action plaintiff.
Obviously, it would be necessary to permit the newly joined
party (the white applicant) to relitigate issues that might have
already been litigated between the other parties,'124 but this
would usually be preferable to risking inconsistent judgments.
Rule nineteen is clearly no panacea. In public law litigation, unlike most litigation arising out of private disputes,
there will often be no way to identify all of the potential litigants at a time when it might be possible to bring them into a
comprehensive adjudication. Even when the potential litigants
can be identified, it may not be feasible to give notice to all of
them, and without adequate notice a second court would naturally be reluctant to hold a second plaintiff bound by the
25
first judgment.1
If the second action is not filed until after the first has
gone to judgment and appeal, joinder is impossible. In that
event, however, the defendant may be able to rely on the outstanding judgment as a defense to the second action. This
defense will clearly be available in some kinds of cases, such
as actions seeking damages for the violation of a civil right
under section 1983.126 It is an open question whether a state
agency could defeat a claim for injunctive or declaratory relief
by pointing to an outstanding order of another federal court
prohibiting the action sought by the plaintiff. Research has
uncovered no case in which the issue has arisen-not surprisingly, because Congress has required that controversies involving a request for an injunction against the enforcement
122FED. R. Cxv. P. 19(a).

123This assumes that the second plaintiff would be subject to the jurisdiction of
the district court in the Ninth Circuit.
124 Cf. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 136
(1967) (ordering case reopened to permit participation by intervenors).
125See Gregory v. Tarr, 436 F.2d 513, 514 n.2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
922 (1971); Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd per
curiam, 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971); see generally Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding
Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REv. 589 (1974).
12642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 941 (1969).
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of a state statute on federal constitutional grounds be adjudicated by a three judge district court, with diiect appeal to the
Supreme Court.1 27 In addition, as suggested earlier, few state
regulations or programs embrace action that has the potential
for being either required or prohibited, depending on a court's
reading of the federal Constitution.
In the rare instances in which parallel lawsuits threaten to
result in orders that cannot be obeyed simultaneously, it will
be necessary, in order to avoid a "subversion" of the legal
order,1 2 8 to provide means of assuring first that the conflict can
be authoritatively resolved, and second that one or both orders
can be stayed during the interim. If the first is made available,
the second will probably follow; for instance, if resolution of
the conflict were made the responsibility of the Supreme
Court, that court would surely grant any appropriate stays.
Conflict resolution devices for the state divided between cir1 29
cuits will be discussed later in this Article.
2.

Conflicting Holdings on the Validity of a State Law
or Practice
To say that inconsistent judgments affirmed by the Ninth
and Twelfth Circuits will not, in any but the rarest cases, place
a state agency in the position of having to disobey one order
or the other is not, of course, to minimize the undesirability
of less acute inter-circuit conflicts. 130 The point, rather, is
that such cases can be assimilated with those in which the two
circuits promulgate different rules of law with respect to the
federal validity of a state statute or practice. In either situation,
the evils which have aroused concern are forum shopping and
differential treatment.
The reasons why differential treatment is regarded as an
evil need hardly be expounded at length. As Judge Friendly
put it, expressing his concern over the proposal to allocate
California's judicial districts between two circuits, "It seems
wrong that an Angeleno should have greater (or less) federal
constitutional rights if he is imprisoned in San Quentin than
12728 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970); see text accompanying notes 141-50 infra.
128See text accompanying note 18 supra.
12
. See text accompanying notes 208-411 infra.
130 See text following note 112 supra.
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nearer home." 13 ' Not all instances of differential treatment,
however, will be equally troubling. Different types of activities
arouse different levels of concern. Variant constitutional rules
for the regulation of business enterprises, for example, may be
thought more tolerable than differences in the protection accorded freedom of speech or freedom from racial discrimination. The nature of the deprivation involved is important as
well. It is one thing if different constitutional rules mean that
a San Diego man goes to jail for conduct which a federal court
in San Francisco holds to be constitutionally protected. It is
quite another matter, and probably less shocking to our sense
of fairness, if the two courts interpret the Social Security Act
differently and a Los Angeles welfare client gets a slightly
larger family grant than a similarly situated client in Sacramento. Ideally, no doubt, the federal Constitution and laws
would mean the same thing in San Diego and San Francisco
(and San Antonio, for that matter); these comments are meant
to suggest only that our willingness to stop short of the ideal
depends not only on the countervailing considerations, but
also on the context in which the ideal is invoked. The judgment involves a balancing process not dissimilar to the "spectrum of standards" which Justice White and Justice Marshall
have discerned in the Supreme Court's recent equal protection
cases.132

The specter of forum shopping is raised because so much
of the litigation challenging the federal validity of state statutes and rules is initiated and guided by individuals or organizations seeking more to vindicate a principle of wide application than to secure redress for the named plaintiff.1 33 If, for
example, one circuit were to exhibit a greater readiness than
131Letter from Judge Henry J. Friendly to A. Leo Levin, Executive Director of
the Commission, Nov. 20, 1973.
132 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
133 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1969, at 11, col. 2:
Poverty lawyers at the Columbia University Center on Social Welfare Policy
and Law in 1966 began planning a test case to get the man in the house
eligibility rule for public assistance declared illegal. This rule held that
fatherless families would lose public assistance if a man resided in the
household.
Edward V. Sparer, head of the center, planned the case. Howard
Thorkelson went to Selma, Ala., and found a client, Mrs. Sylvester Smith.
See generally Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
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the other to intervene in the administration of prison systems,
groups seeking to have prison practices struck down on a statewide basis would naturally tend to initiate their litigation in
the more favorable forum. Similarly, if one circuit gave a more
expansive reading than the other to Supreme Court decisions
such as Sniadach1 34 and Fuentes, 35 groups seeking to challenge
various attachment statutes would tend to bring their lawsuits
in district courts in that circuit.' 3 6 Even if he were not seeking
a decision of statewide application, a public interest litigant
might be interested in shopping for a more receptive forum;
he might hope that the ruling would prompt compliance on a
statewide basis, provide persuasive authority in the other cir37
cuit, or at least set a pattern for other litigants.
A related source of concern is the prospect that a public
issue group such as the American Civil Liberties Union or the
Sierra Club, having lost in one circuit on an issue of the validity of a state law, would be able to relitigate the issue in the
other circuit. If the same plaintiff were involved, the first judgment would, of course, bar a second action; but this rule would
38
not apply to someone who was not a party to the earlier suit.'
The organization would thus have two bites at the apple; from
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORDER
557, 561; Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare, 58
MINN. L. REv. 211, 219-29 (1973).
M Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
133 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
136The scope for differing views has probably been expanded by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974). By a
vote of five to four, the Court upheld Louisiana's sequestration statute. Justice
White, writing for the majority, purported to distinguish the case from Fuentes. Id.
at 1904-05. The dissenters insisted that Fuentes was controlling and required invalidation of the Louisiana law. Id. at 1912-13, 1914. Justice Powell, while concurring
in the majority opinion, stated that the Court was now "withdraw[ing] significantly
from the full reach of [the] principle [enunciated in Fuentes], and to this extent . . .
the Fuentes opinion is overruled." Id. at 1908.
137A statement addressed to the Commission on behalf of the State Bar of
California emphasized this point:
It is difficult to understand why an appellate structure should be created
which would allow larger organizations wishing the resolution of certain
legal questions to pick and choose where the controversy will be resolved.
Certainly some of this exists today, but it is not desireable [sic], and should
not be increased.
STATE

BAR

OF

CALIFORNIA,

STATEMENT

CONCERNING

THE

RESTRUCTURING

OF THE

NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (1973) (on file at the Commission).

138 A nonparty might be bound by a judgment if he were found to have "controlled" the litigation. See lB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

(2d ed. 1974).

0.411 [6], at 1564-67
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the state's point of view, the successive actions might appear
to be a form of harassment. The picture is even less attractive when it is recalled that a successful attack on a state statute
in the first lawsuit may well be held binding throughout the
state.1 3 9 For a public issue group guiding but not controlling
litigation, the motto would be "heads, we win; tails, you
lose.,'1 40
Given the sharp differences of judicial opinion that frequently characterize litigation involving the federal validity
of state laws, the fears just described can hardly be dismissed
out of hand. In considering the weight to be given them in
evaluating the proposal to bifurcate California, two kinds of
inquiries are relevant. First are questions directed to placing
the problem in perspective. How frequently are conflicts likely
to arise? What is the practical effect of a conflict between
courts with respect to the validity of state law? How seriously
should such a consequence be regarded? What lessons may be
drawn from experience with existing situations of overlapping
jurisdiction? Second, what means are available to avoid or resolve conflicts between the Ninth and Twelfth Circuits on the
validity of California laws? The latter point will be taken up
at the end of this article; the issue of perspective will be addressed forthwith.
Preliminarily, it is necessary to note that, under current
law, many actions challenging the validity of state laws-probably including the most controversial ones' 4 1-must be brought
before a three judge district court, with direct appeal to the
Supreme Court.' 4 2 The court of appeals becomes involved in
the process only when the chief judge selects the judges to
serve on the three judge courts.' 43 As long as this provision
remains in effect, litigation falling within its purview would
not be significantly affected if the judicial districts of California were allocated between two circuits. At worst-if three
'"
See note 117 supra & accompanying text.
40

Cf Z. CHAFEE, SUpra note 116, at 227.
See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F.
Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (aid to
parochial education); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337
F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex., 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (state school financing
system); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970); aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion statutes).
142 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281 (1970).
143
Id.§ 2284(1) (1970) (at least onejudge must be a circuit judge).
'

"4
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judge courts are convened in both circuits, and both cases
proceed to judgment-there will be a period of uncertainty
until one of the judgments is reviewed by the Supreme Court.
More plausibly, one of the courts will stay proceedings until
the Supreme Court's decision in the first case. It would even
be possible for the two proceedings to be consolidated in a
single district, especially if the parties are agreeable to such
a move.

1 44

In June 1973, the Senate passed Senate Bill 271 to eliminate the requirement of a three judge court in constitutional
litigation, except for reapportionment cases. 1 4 5 The bill has
received wide support and, until recently, little opposition; it
is thus quite possible that suits which must now be adjudicated
by a three judge court will soon be brought before a single
district judge and appealed to the court of appeals like any
other case. Even today, however, when a plaintiff seeks to
enjoin the operation of a state statute on the ground that it
has been pre-empted by congressional action or that it is inconsistent with a federal law, no three judge court is convened.' 46 Nor need a three judge court be convened when the
rule challenged is of less than statewide application, even if
it is a municipal ordinance which may be in force in every
major city in the state. 1 4 7 Finally, it has been held that a three
judge court is not required when the plaintiff seeks only a
declaratory judgment and not injunctive relief.1 48 Whether or
not S. 271 is enacted, therefore, the courts of appeals will be
adjudicating the validity of governmental practices in cases
that may have a statewide impact. In light of this fact, and the
likelihood that S. 271 may soon become law, it will be assumed
for the sake of argument that all federal court litigation involving the validity of state laws, including those cases now
144Cf. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 854 (W.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y., 1968),
aff'd mem., 393 U.S. 405, 406 (1969) (two identical three judge courts). Inter-circuit
consolidation would require the assignment of one district judge outside his circuit,
as permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 292(d) (1970), upon designation by the Chief Justice.
On its face, § 2284(1) does not require that the circuit judge on a three judge court
be from any particular circuit.
145S. 271, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See 119 CONG. REc. S 11114 (daily ed.
June 14, 1973).
146Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
147 See Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 102 (1967).
148 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1963); AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, STUDY

OF THE DIVISION

OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN

COURTS 322-23 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY].

STATE
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FEDERAL
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governed by the three judge court requirement, will be decided in the first instance by the regular district courts and on
appeal by the courts of appeals. To the extent 14 9 and for the
duration 150 that three judge courts are retained, the problems
arising out of bifurcation are mitigated.
Apart from the three judge court requirement, conflicts
will often be avoided because the judgment of the court which
first adjudicates the federal validity of a state law will have a
binding effect in both circuits. This outcome is most easily
achieved when the court in the first action holds the statute
invalid. Take first the most direct kind of challenge: the plaintiff brings suit in one of the circuits seeking an injunction
against the enforcement of the statute and naming as defendant the state official charged with enforcing it. If the action
is successful, the judgment will ordinarily preclude the defendant from enforcing the law anywhere within the state, and
there would be no need for anyone to pursue a separate action
in the other circuit. This result follows most clearly when the
plaintiff has sued and won on behalf of a class,1 5 ' but in the
usual case it will be accomplished in any event as a consequence of the binding effect attaching to any injunction issued
over whom the court has in personam
against a defendant
52
jurisdiction.
Complications may arise when a state regulation is administered on a day-to-day basis by local government officials or
149Senate Bill 271 would retain the requirement of a three judge court for
cases involving the reapportionment of congressional districts of any statewide
legislative body. To this extent, of course, it would make no change in present law,
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). For reasons given in the preceding paragraph of the text,
this means that reapportionment litigation should create no new problems in California, even if the Commission's realignment plan is adopted without special conflict
resolution mechanisms. See text accompanying notes 141-44 supra.
150 It may be that by the time the S. 271 goes into effect, Congress will have
adopted conflict resolution mechanisms of general application. See note 88 supra.
151See, e.g., Steward v. Butz, 491 F.2d 165, 166 (6th Cir. 1974); Bermudez v.
United States Dep't of Agric., 490 F.2d 718, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Advertising
Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 1956); Theriault v. Carlson,
353 F. Supp. 1061, 1067 (N.D. Ga. 1973) vacated and remanded on other grounds, 495
F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173, 1191 (E.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 402 U.S. 991 (1971).
152 See Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 451-52 (1932);
Theriault v. Carlson, 353 F. Supp. 1061, 1067 (N.D. Ga. 1973), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[lI]t is . . . well established that where
the respondent is properly before the court, the district court decree is binding
upon the respondent, not simply within the local district, but throughout the United
States."). Cf Bermudez v. Dep't of Agric., 490 F.2d 718, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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agencies. 153 In such a situation, however, the first plaintiff
could obtain statewide relief by bringing an action against
the class of local officials who in fact enforce the state law
claimed to be invalid. For instance, the courts have permitted
actions against the class of "all county sheriffs . . . and of all

54
wardens and jailers of the city and town jails of Alabama,"'
and against the class of all Virginia state court judges empowered to commit persons pursuant to certain statutes dealing
with the confinement of alcoholics. 55 Alternatively, where
plaintiffs in the first suit have prevailed against a defendant
state official who has power to control the relevant activities
of the local agencies or administrators, individuals in the other
circuit may be able to bring suit to require him to compel
56
obedience to the first court's decree by the local agencies.
Even where the law is not enforced by governmental officials
at all, but by private parties, it may be possible to obtain a
judgment with statewide effect by bringing an action against
57
an appropriate class of defendants.
More difficult problems would be presented if, after a
state statute was upheld in one of the circuits, the state sought
to use the judgment to defeat an action by a different plaintiff
in the other circuit. Under current law, there is probably only
one circumstance in which this could be done: 158 if the first
55 See note 196 infra.

154Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 329, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd per
curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
155Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181, 190 (E.D. Va. 1970). See also id. at 193
(suggesting that court may have duty, under FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1) & 21, to join
local prosecutors and perhaps police officials as defendants); but cf. Schneider v.
Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741, 746 (D. Mass. 1972); Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp.
431, 438 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
156Compare Anderson v. Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789, 792 (M.D. Tenn. 1969)
with Smith v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 444 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1971). See
also Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741, 746 (D. Mass. 1972) (court declined
to certify defendant class of all state court clerks authorized to issue trustee process
writs under statute declared unconstitutional; state attorney general advised sheriffs

not to serve writs dated after court's decision); Bradley v. School Bd., 51 F.R.D. 139,
142-43 (E.D. Va. 1970); note 120 supra.
'5 See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 722 & n.3 (D. Conn.

1973); Research Corp., v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497,
(N.D. Ill.
1969), appeal dismissed sub noma.Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co.,
F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). In Lynch the plaintiff represented a class of persons
had debts owing to them currently being garnished prior to judgment pursuant

503
425
who
to a

Connecticut statute. The defendant represented a class of persons who had garnished
debts owing to the plaintiff class under that law. The court held that the class action

was proper.
15'In theory, there is a second possibility: the court might find that the plaintiff
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action had been brought as a class action, and the second court
found that the class representative in fact had adequately protected the interests of the class. 159 The Fifth Circuit has applied a stringent standard of de novo review on the latter issue,
asking "whether the representative, through qualified counsel,
vigorously and tenaciously protected the interests of the
class."' 160 Another approach to collateral review, however,
would look to the performance of their obligations
by both counsel and trial judge and, before a judgment is held not binding, would insist upon a showing
that a defect in one went uncorrected by the other
and that this defect affected the conduct of the litigation in a manner likely to have prejudiced the.
interests of61the absent class members challenging the
judgment.'
Unless the first court has committed an "abuse of discretion,"
the second court would accept the decisions of the first as to
the adequacy of representation and the fairness of any settlement.' 62 Under this standard, if the first action were brought
by a public issue litigant on behalf of a statewide class, and
pursued vigorously but unsuccessfully through trial and appeal, 63 a court in the other circuit might well hold that class
members in that circuit were precluded from relitigating the
64
issue.'
In situations other than those described, res judicata will
probably not play a significant role in preventing duplicative
litigation-for instance, when the federal validity of a state
law is litigated initially in a habeas corpus action 1 65 or in a
suit between private litigants.' 66 Nor will res judicata doctrines
in the second suit had "controlled" the prosecution of the earlier action. See note 138
supra. As a practical matter, such a situation is not likely to arise. Cf. In re Daly, 291
Minn. 488, 492, 189 N.W. 2d 176, 180 (1971).
159Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Research Corp. v. Edward
J. Funk & Sons Co., 15 FED. RULES SERV. 2d. 580 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
160 474 F.2d at 75.
'61 Note, supra note 125, at 603-04.
62
1 Id. 604.

163 Cf Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75 (5th Cir. 1973).
164 See Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D.
39, 45-47 (1967); Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv.

629, 657-60 (1965).
'65See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 94 S. Ct. 1242 (1974).
166 See, e.g., Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.
1973).
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apply in most instances in which the first court upholds the
statute, whatever the context. Here, however, other mitigating
doctrines may come into play.
Review of state governmental actions by federal courts is
a delicate matter whether state procedures are tested in two
circuits or in one.167 Because this is such a sensitive area, the
power of the federal courts to intervene has been hedged
about with restrictions, including the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies,' 1 68 the various abstention doctrines,169
and the Anti-Injunction Acts.' 7 0 These statutes and doctrines
will prevent many conflicts that might otherwise occur in a
state divided between two circuits.' 71 That is, there would be
no conflict because neither court would decide the merits of
the challenge to the state law; instead, both would leave the
matter to the state courts.
Of course, this does not dispose of the problem in its
full dimension, nor does it purport to do so. One need only
read at random through a volume of Federal Reporter or
Federal Supplement to see that notwithstanding the restrictions imposed by statutes and judicial doctrines, litigation
attacking the validity of state laws continues to be brought
and adjudicated in the federal courts. It seems probable, however, that the judges of each of the new courts would exhibit
,'an appropriate sensitivity to the consequences of conflicting
decisions and a willingness to invoke the principles of comity
and deference to a recent decision by a court of equal stature." 17 2 Both circuits are likely to draw a majority of their
judges from the California bar, and those judges, at least,
would certainly be conscious of whatever mischief might result
from conflicting decisions on a particular issue.17 3 In addition,
as already noted, both courts would inherit the law of the
7

16 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 240.

See H. HART & H. WECHSLEa, supra note 27, at 980-85.
id. 1043-44 & n.1. The abstention doctrines, once thought to be in danger
of destruction, see Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in
an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604 (1967), are now "alive and well." Hearings on
168

169See

S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm.

on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 751-52 (1972) (statement of Judge Friendly).
170See H. HART & H. WECHSLER supra note 27, at 962-66.
171 COMMISSION REPORT,
72

1

supra note 3 at 240.

Id.

173 As Judge Browning of the Ninth Circuit observed at the Commission's hearings, "responsible Judges are very reluctant to create inter-Circuit conflicts, certainly an
inter-Circuit conflict [with respect] to the effect [on] single state institutions. It is
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present Ninth Circuit and, in the immediate future, its judges;
moreover, in many cases the precedents will point in a single
direction. These circumstances suggest that conflicts will not
lightly be created.174 In some instances, to be sure, the judges
of the second court of appeals will conclude that they cannot
in good conscience follow the decision of their sister court
upholding or striking down a state law. When this occurs, the
conflict is likely to be the result of "so fundamental a clash of
values" 175 that the Supreme Court will probably take the issue
for review.1 76 Admittedly, as Dean Griswold and others have
pointed out, a conflict among the circuits no longer results
17 7
automatically in a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court;
but the cases cited in support of this proposition involve, almost without exception, the construction of federal tax laws
and other issues of statutory interpretation.1 7 No claim is
made that the Supreme Court, by failing to resolve conflicts,
is leaving the states in doubt as to the constitutionality of their
statutes.179
almost inconceivable to me." Commission Hearings, supra note 21, San Francisco, Cal.,
Aug. 30, 1973, at 72 (testimony of Judge Browning).
"'Judge Ben. C. Duniway of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed the
point even more strongly:
Challenges to the actions of state agencies or to the validity of state laws
now arise most often in three-judge district courts . . . . There are four
districts in California. Thus it has long been possible for similar actions to
be filed in two different districts and to have three-judge courts in those
districts come out with conflicting decisions. So far as I know, since 1961,
when I became a member of this court, this has never happened....
If, on the other hand, three-judge courts were abolished so that decisions would be made by a single district judge, and would be appealable to
the appropriate court of appeals, I think the possibility of conflict is still
imaginary rather than real. The natural tendency of one circuit or one
district court to follow rather than to disagree with the decision of another
circuit or district court should eliminate, and I think would eliminate,
the possibility of conflict ....
Letter from Judge Ben. C. Duniway to Attorney General William B. Saxbe, Feb. 8,
1974, at 2, on file at the Commission; but see text accompanying notes 182-86 infra.
175 CommissIoN REPORT, supra note 3, at 240.
176 The judges of the second court to consider an issue "are not going to create
a conflict unless it is a matter of great moment. If it is a matter of great moment, then
it is the kind of conflict the United States Supreme Court ought to be considering... " Commission Hearings, supra note 23, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30, 1973, at
72 (testimony of Judge Browning).
177Commission Hearings, supra note 23, Washington, D.C., Aug. 2, 1973, at 67
(testimony of Dean Griswold).
78
' See Griswold, supra note 24, at 630-31.
179 P. CARRINGTON, FEDERAL APPELLATE CASELOADS AND JUDGESHIPS 8 (1974)
("It is generally agreed that . . . constitutional litigation in the federal courts . . .
is now well supervised by the Supreme Court ..
"). To some extent, of course,
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Even apart from the possibility of resolution by the Supreme Court, 8 0 Congress might well conclude that, in this
as in other contexts, occasional conflicts can be lived with.
Consider, for example, the situation in California today. With
the state divided into four federal judicial districts, courts
in two of those districts may reach opposing conclusions on
the constitutionality of a state law. Until the issue is taken to
the court of appeals and finally resolved authoritatively for
all of California, the consequences of conflict are felt in much
the same way that they would be if two circuits were exercising jurisdiction within the state. 18 1 Nor are conflicts at the
district court level necessarily of short duration. One example
is the recent litigation involving challenges to sections 9503
and 9504 of the California Commercial Code, which permit
self-help repossession by creditors, without formal legal proceedings. In February, 1972, the federal court for the Southern District of California held that the two provisions violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1 82 "A
few weeks later and a few hundred miles to the north,"'8 3 the
federal court for the Northern District, explicitly refusing to
follow the holding of the Southern District, ruled that repossession under the authority of the Commercial Code did not
constitute state action and thus did not violate a constitutional
right. 8 4 The federal validity of self-help repossession was
not settled for the entire state until October 1973, more than
this situation may be attributed to the fact that so much of the litigation involving
the constitutionality of state statutes is heard by three judge courts, with direct appeal
to the Supreme Court. Many other cases, however, come within only the Court's
certiorari jurisdiction. Moreover, even as to cases within the Court's appeal jurisdiction, the Court may summarily affirm, leaving its view of the issues very much in
doubt. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576 (1973); STUDY GROUP, supra note
72, at 596.
180Other conflict-resolution mechanisms may also be available. See text accompanying notes 303-92 infra.
181There is an important difference between these two situations, of course.
The court of appeals must hear appeals brought by a party to one of the district
court actions; but the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is discretionary.
This means that if a conflict arises between district courts, the losing party in the
second suit can assure court of appeals review; if the conflict is between two courts
of appeals, the losing party may not be able to obtain Supreme Court review even
if he wants it. But see text following note 396 infra. The point is that the interim uncertainty is likely to have similar consequences in either situation.
182Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub noma.
Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
183Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727, 729 n.3 (D. Colo. 1972).
184Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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a year and a half after the conflicting district court decisions,
when the Ninth Circuit reversed the holding of the Southern
District court. 18 5 Similar conflicts arise within the state court
system; these too may remain unresolved for considerable
periods. For instance, inconsistent decisions with respect to
the constitutionality of various attachment statutes persisted
among California's intermediate appellate courts for more
than a year until the state supreme court spoke authoritatively
on the issue in August 1971.186
Apart from conflicts among state courts and among federal courts, in recent years there have also been conflicting
constitutional decisions by a state court and a federal court
with jurisdiction over the state. The phenomenon has become
most familiar in the area of criminal law, although it is not
confined to it. Typically the conflict is created by a federal
court's collateral review of a state court conviction, and typically the federal court finds a constitutional infirmity in procedures which the state courts have found to be permissible.
For instance, in 1971 the Maine Supreme judicial Court, reviewing a conviction on direct appeal, rejected a constitutional challenge to a jury charge, that had been used in state
criminal cases for a hundred years. 187 The defendant then
sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. Both the
district court and the court of appeals were persuaded by the
arguments that had been rejected by the state court. 18 8 In a
separate case a few months later, the Maine court adhered to
its previous ruling, insisting in sharp terms that the First Circuit's constitutional holding rested upon a misinterpretation
of state law.' 89 A more unusual example comes from Illinois.
The state supreme court upheld a conviction under an ordi190
nance which the federal district court had ruled invalid;
the Seventh Circuit, without adverting to the merits of the con185 Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
186Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 543 n.2, 488 P.2d 13, 16, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709, 712 (1971).
187 State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971).
188Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (D. Me. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wilbur v.
Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1973), remandedfor reconsideration, 94 S. Ct. 889, adhered to on remand, 496 F.2d 1303 (1st Cir. 1974).
189 State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973).
190 Chicago v. Lawrence, 42 Ill.2d 461, 248 N.E.2d 71 (1969); see Landry v.
Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ill. 1968), appeal dismissed as moot, 410 F.2d 551 (7th
Cir. 1969).
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stitutional argument, held that the Illinois court was within
its rights in ignoring the federal court's declaratory judgment. 19'
Conflicts between federal courts and state courts are not
limited to criminal cases. Recently the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that the state's "public policy" prevented an oil
company from terminating a service station lease without good
cause. 192 A few months later, the federal district court in New
Jersey held that the state court's decision was "invalid and
inapplicable"'1 93 because it interfered with the "total control"
given the owner of a federally registered trademark by the
Lanham Act. 1 94 In Arizona, a three judge federal court struck
down a state statute requiring a year's residence in a county
as a condition to receiving non-emergency hospitalization or
medical care at county expense.' 9 5 A year later, the state supreme court, rejecting the reasoning of the federal court,
191 United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970).

In Florida, the state court and the federal courts agreed that the state's "felony
sodomy" statute was "void on its face as unconstitutional for vagueness and uncertainty in its language," but disagreed about whether the holding of unconstitutionality was to be given retroactive application. See Stone v. Wainwright, 478 F.2d 390
(5th Cir.), rev'd, 414 U.S. 21 (1973); Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971).
A few years earlier, the Supreme Court of New Jersey and the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit engaged in a well-publicized difference of opinion over the proper
interpretation of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Third Circuit stated its position in May 1965, United
States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965), and the New Jersey
court stated its position in November 1965, State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 35-36, 214
A.2d 393, 403 (1965). The Supreme Court did not elucidate its holding until June
1966. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
More recently, an issue involving the admissibility of confessions divided the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
See Eisen v. Picard, 452 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Masskow, 290 N.E. 2d 154 (Mass. 1972). The Massachusetts court,
adverting to the 'conflict and noting that its decision was "in effect reviewable by
writ of habeas corpus" in the federal courts, stated that "[i]t
would be undesirable
for us to affirm the conviction of a defendant if the inevitable consequence were
that he would be released" by a federal court holding the confession inadmissible.
290 N.E.2d at 157. The court therefore assumed, without deciding, that the federal
decision "accurately states the Federal law." Id. This did not prevent the court from
affirming the conviction, however, for the court found that the admission of the
confession was harmless error. Id. at 158. Only a close study of the record would
reveal whether this denouement should properly be characterized as an admirable
effort to avoid federal-state court friction or a deplorable attempt to frustrate a
federal right.
192 Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973).
" Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 368 F. Supp. 1401 (D.N.J. 1974).
194 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
195 Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1971).
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upheld the requirement. 196 The United States Supreme Court
97
noted probable jurisdiction in order to resolve the conflict.'
More than a year and a half after the state court had upheld
98
the statute, the Supreme Court reversed its judgment.
To acknowledge that conflicts over constitutional interpretations may arise today within a single state is not, of
course, to say that such clashes are desirable, nor is the existence of some conflicts an argument for designing an appellate
structure that may add new ones. The point, rather, is twofold. First, as an absolute matter, there is enough play in the
joints of the affected systems that they can withstand whatever
strain is placed on them by the conflicts which do occur. Second, in relative terms, we are willing to tolerate these occasional conflicts, whatever mischief they may bring, because
we deem them an acceptable price to pay for the various countervailing benefits. In considering the ultimate desirability
of dividing California between two circuits, one must engage
in a similar balancing process, taking into account the probable
effect of any steps which Congress or the courts may take to
prevent or resolve conflicts. 199
"' Maricopa County v. Superior Court, 108 Ariz. 373, 498 P.2d 461 (1972).
The litigation arose after the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors continued to
enforce the durational residency requirement notwithstanding the federal court
decision. The defendants in the earlier litigation included members of the Board
of Supervisors of Pinal County and the state attorney general. It is not clear from
the opinion of the three judge court in Valenciano whether the plaintiffs, who brought
their action on behalf of "themselves and all others similarly situated," 323 F. Supp.
at 601, sought statewide injunctive relief. Quaere whether a new resident of Maricopa
County might have been able successfully to bring suit against the state attorney
general to compel obedience by the county board to the federal court decree, cf.
Smith v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. 444 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1971); Bradley v.
School Board, 51 F.R.D. 139, 142 (E.D. Va. 1970); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1789, at 179-83 (1972); or whether the newcomer might even have been able to bring ancillary injunctive proceedings against
the county board itself, cf. 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONs 625-29 (1972). See generally notes
153-56 supra & accompanying text.
197Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 410 U.S. 981 (1973).
198 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 94 S. Ct. 1076 (1974).
199For an example of efforts by two courts to avoid "any semblance of a conflict,"
see Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 490 F.2d 133, 138-39 (10th Cir. 1973); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Laborers' Local 612, 489 F.2d 749 (Temp. Em. Ct. App.
1973). The "strange" and "anomalous" situation, 490 F.2d at 139, arose when appeals were taken to both the Tenth Circuit and the Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals from the same district court judgment. Both appeals dealt with the same
issue, the validity of a collective bargaining contract. The Tenth Circuit expressed
reluctance to decide the issue and remanded the case to the district court. The Emergency Court of Appeals, having exercised jurisdiction over a prior appeal in the
same controversy, see Associated Gen. Contractors v. Laborers' Local 612, 476 F.2d
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For further guidance in assessing the likely consequences
of conflicting rules, we may look to the patterns which have
developed in the evolution of our federal system. Enterprises
whose operations cross jurisdictional boundaries have long
conducted their business under a bewildering variety of regulations and exactions. National corporations must conform
to state laws; statewide businesses must obey the regulations
of local governmental units. The need to adjust operations to
different requirements and prohibitions sometimes results
in inconvenience and extra costs, but here too the price is regarded as a tolerable one. Similarly, many federal instrumentalities routinely adjust their operations in accordance with
200
policies in the various states.
In its decisions explicating and applying the "negative
implications" of the commerce clause, the Supreme Court has
carefully scrutinized the context and the effect of state regulations in order to determine whether they deal with a matter
as to which uniform legislation is required throughout the
nation, or whether, on the contrary, a diversity of rules is consistent with the needs of a national economy. 20 ' The cases are
familiar.20 2 When South Carolina sought to limit the width and
weight of trucks passing through the state, the court found
the regulation to be permissible, notwithstanding the fact that
virtually all other states permitted wider and heavier trucks.20 3
Later, when Illinois attempted to require trucks and trailers
to use a new kind of mudguard, in conflict with the requirement of at least one other state that trucks use the conventional kind, the court struck down the law. 20 4 The thrust of the
decisions is that some inconsistencies in regulations can be
1388 (Temp. Em. Ct. App. 1973), now concluded that the Tenth Circuit had exclusive
jurisdiction over the remaining issues, and dismissed the new appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
200See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 114 (1970) (construction of federal aid highways); 42
U.S.C. § 306 (1970) (old age assistance).
201 A similar approach is used in cases involving state regulations which may
clash with other exercises of congressional power. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1885 (1974) (patent clause); Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 552-55 (1973) (copyright clause).
202 The leading case remains Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851); see Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
203 South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
204 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). Although Bibb leaves
room for doubt about the exact grounds for the holding, the Court later clarified
the rationale of the case: "Although we struck down the Illinois law in Bibb, we did
so on the carefully limited basis that the contour mudguard requirement flatly con-
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tolerated by interstate enterprises, notwithstanding the added
cost and inconvenience; at some point, however, the burden
arising out of inconsistent rules becomes so great that the state
20 5 must give way. 20 6
which is "out of line"
A similar sense of discrimination is necessary in evaluating
the likely effect of a diversity of rules resulting from inconsistent decisions by the Ninth and Twelfth Circuits. Conflicts
are not fungible. The extent to which we are troubled by the
promulgation of different .rules of law within a state will depend on a number of variables: the conduct involved, the constitutional or statutory provisions in question, the consequences
of differential treatment to those affected by the inconsistent
rules of law, the probable duration of the conflict, and the
likelihood of resolution by an instrumentality outside the federal courts of appeals-Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Judicial Conference, or any number of independent or executive-branch agencies. When all of these factors are taken
into consideration, how many of the conflicts that are likely
to arise in the state would resemble the truck-width case, and
how many might be likened to the mudguard case?
Allocating the judicial districts of California between two
circuits is not a tidy arrangement, perhaps, nor will it satisfy
those for whom consistency is the supreme virtue. At the same
time, one can easily overestimate the difficulties to be anticipated, even with respect to constitutional litigation. Not all
challenges to the validity of state statutes are adjudicated by
the federal courts; 20 7 not all adjudicated challenges are susceptible to conflicting resolutions; not all potential conflicts
flicted with laws, enforced in at least one other State, that trucks must be equipped
with straight mudguards." Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 140 n.13 (1968).
20- 359 U.S. at 529.
206 For a discussion of the "negative" aspects of the commerce clause, see
D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL & STATE 285-94 (1974); i B. SCHWARTZ,
A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION
GOVERNMENT 243-67 (1963).

OF THE

UNITED

STATES:

THE POWERS

OF

"207 This observation is particularly apt with respect to California, because the
state supreme court has not hesitated, in recent years, to hold state statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1973) (automobile guest statute); People v. Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 503 P.2d
257, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972) (standards for abortion); Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar
Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972) (statutory exclusion of aliens from practice of law); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d
880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972) (death penalty); Randone v. Appellate Department,
5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) (attachment procedures); Blair
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will materialize; and not all actual conflicts will do more than
scratch the skin of the body politic. For those conflicts which
threaten to inflict more serious wounds, remedial and preventive medicines are available.
II.

MECHANISMS FOR AVOIDING OR RESOLVING CONFLICTS

After concluding that the problems that might be created by
allocating the judicial districts of California between two circuits would be "of lesser magnitude and significance" than
those created by other realignment proposals, the Commission adds that "any problems that might arise . . . can be re-

solved by existing mechanisms and others that could readily
be developed. '20 8 Part II of this article focuses on these various mechanisms. The treatment is in three parts: existing
mechanisms for avoiding inconsistent orders in litigation crossing circuit boundaries; mechanisms for avoiding or resolving
conflicts in the interpretation of state law; and finally, mechanisms for avoiding or resolving conflicting decisions with
respect to the validity of a state statute or practice. The discussion is intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive.
A. Existing Mechanismsfor Avoiding Inconsistent Orders
in Litigation Crossing Circuit Boundaries
At least half a dozen mechanisms developed by Congress
and the courts are available today to deal with litigation that
is not confined, or that may not be confined, within a single
circuit. Some of these are too familiar to warrant elaborate
treatment here, but all of them serve to demonstrate that even
without changes in the law, the two circuits in a bifurcated
state would not lack ways to avoid duplicative lawsuits and
potentially inconsistent judgments when disputes cut across
circuit boundaries.
1. Transfer of Cases Between Courts of Appeals
In a variety of circumstances involving petitions for review
of orders of federal administrative agencies, one court of apv. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 468 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) (prejudgment
replevin). See also Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 1973),
aff'd, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974) (three judge court dismisses prisoners' constitutional
claim as moot because question raised was resolved in prisoners' favor by California
Supreme Court).
2. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 238.
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peals may transfer a proceeding before it to another court of
appeals.2 0 9 Most commonly, transfers are effected under the
authority of section 2112(a) of the Judicial Code, 1 ° which provides that when proceedings have been instituted in two or
more courts of appeals with respect to "the same order" of
an administrative agency, all of the proceedings are to be
transferred to the court in which the first appeal was instituted. More important, once the initial transfer has been effected, the transferee court has authority to transfer all of the
proceedings to any other court of appeals "[flor the convenience of the parties in the interest of justice." In addition to
this statutory authority, the courts of appeals are held to have
an "inherent discretionary power" to transfer a proceeding
to another circuit "in the interest of justice and sound judicial
administration."211
Several aspects of the transfer cases are of special interest
in the present context. First, the procedure is highly discretionary. This is clearly so under the "inherent power" doctrine
and under the retransfer provision of section 2112(a), 2 12 but
there is room for discretion even under the seemingly automatic "first instituted" provision of the statute. For instance,
"where the first petition to review is filed by a party who is
not substantially aggrieved, in effect undercutting the assumption of a good faith petition to review ,' 213 a court may decline
20. See cases cited in Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 563 (1968).
210 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1970). The statute provides, in relevant part:

If proceedings have been instituted in two or more courts of appeals with
respect to the same order the agency, board, commission, or office concerned shall file the record in that one of such courts in which a proceeding
with respect to such order was first instituted. The other courts in which
such proceedings are pending shall thereupon transfer them to the court
of appeals in which the record has been filed, For the convenience of the
parties in the interest of justice such court may thereafter transfer all the
proceedings with respect to such order to any other court of appeals.
For the history of the provision see Ball v. NLRB, 299 F.2d 683, 687 (4th Cir. 1962);
Comment, A Proposal to End the Race to the Court House in Appeals from Federal Administrative Orders, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 166, 168-69 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Race to
the Court House].
211 Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1973); Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.
v. FPC, 343 F.2d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 1965). Contra, Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 330 F.2d 824
(5th Cir. 1965).
2'2 See, e.g., Saturn Airways, Inc., v. CAB, 476 F.2d 907, 909 (2d Cir. 1973);
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
213 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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to transfer proceedings to the circuit chosen by the first petitioner. 214 As one court put it, "merely to be first in reaching
a court house is not enough; lacking genuine aggrievement,
one may not enter. ' 2 15 Nor is it always self-evident whether
or not two petitions involve "the same order"; in deciding
whether they do, the courts may exercise a certain amount of
discretion, looking to the policy underlying the statute and
the doctrine.2 16
Second, the transfer mechanism is regularly used to avoid
the possibility of inconsistent decisions by two or more courts
of appeals. For example, when various petitions for review
of the Federal Communications Commission's Second Order
relating to cable television were lodged in the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to the mandatory
provision of section 2112(a), that court transferred all of the
proceedings to the Eighth Circuit. 2 17 The District of Columbia
court noted that the Eighth Circuit already had under submission cases involving the Commission's First Report and
Order. Although the issues in the two sets of cases were "not
' 21 9
completely identical, ' 218 they were "intimately related,
and the court sought to avoid "the anomalous results inherent
in the possibility of conflicting decisions on review. 2 20 More
recently, the First Circuit was asked to transfer a review petition to the District of Columbia Circuit, where a related proceeding was pending. The court agreed, pointing out that
litigation in several circuits would lead to "possible inconsistent and delayed results on the merits."2 2 '
The transfer mechanism is notable also in that proceedings may be transferred or retransferred notwithstanding the
objection of a petitioner who has not previously been a party to
related proceedings in the transferee court. The result is that
one or more petitioners may be denied their choice of forum.
214 Irtsurance Workers Intl Union v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see
Municipal Distrib. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dictum); UAW
v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Race to the Court House, supra note 210, at 170.
215Insurance Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 823, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
216 See, e.g., ACLU v. FCC, 486 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
217Midwest Television, Inc. v. FCC, 364 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
21
BId. at 675.
219
Id. at 675 n.6.
22 0
Id.at 675-76.
221Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492, 495 (Ist Cir. 1972).
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The point was dramatically demonstrated by a recent case arising out of a lengthy inquiry by the Federal Communications
222
Commission with respect to regulation of cable television.
After the Commission's final action in the proceeding, a cable
company petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit, objecting
to a divestiture order. Shortly thereafter, the American Civil
Liberties Union filed in the District of Columbia Circuit a
petition for review of a Commission order issued during the
course of the same proceeding, but involving regulation of
common carriers. Pursuant to the "first instituted" rule of section 2112(a), the Commission filed the record of the entire
proceeding in the San Francisco court. The agency then moved
in the District of Columbia Circuit to transfer the ACLU's petition to the Ninth Circuit. The ACLU objected, pointing out
that the Ninth Circuit, in passing on the divestiture order,
would not be considering the issue on which the ACLU was
seeking review. The court agreed that "the particular subject
matter of the two petitions is not the same,"223 but granted
the transfer nonetheless, so that "the action of the agency
[would not be] subjected to fragmentary review by different
courts. '22 4 In another recent case, the District of Columbia
Circuit transferred a case to the Fifth Circuit because that court
was "familiar with the background of the controversy through
review of the same or related proceedings." The petitioner had
225
objected strongly to the transfer.
Finally, section 2112(a) transfers are granted notwithstanding the likelihood that the transferee court will take a different view of the merits of the case than the transferor court.
In contrast to the rule applicable to many transfers at the
district court level, 22 6 it seems to be assumed that a transferee
court of appeals will apply its own law to all of the petitions
before it. Indeed, this assumption is implicit in decisions ordering transfer in order to avoid "the anomalous results inherent
in the possibility of conflicting decisions on review. '' 227 Because
of the complexity of the issues raised, it is seldom possible to
222 ACLU v. FCC, 486 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
223

Id. at 414.

224 Id.

22' Municipal Distrib. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
226 See text accompanying notes 316-42 infra.
227 Midwest Television, Inc. v. FCC, 364 F.2d 674, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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say with assurance that a particular transfer, or denial of a
transfer motion, has changed the result in a particular case,
but occasionally one can make the inference. 22 8 Apart from
specific inconsistencies in holdings, however, proceedings
for review of administrative agency action constitute a class
of cases in which judicial attitudes are thought to vary from
circuit to circuit. 22 9 To the extent that this perception is accurate, transfers at the court of appeals level may well change
the result of litigation. Moreover, if transfers are appropriate
notwithstanding that possibility, they may be equally appropriate in other kinds of cases when "the same or related proceedings" are in litigation in a sister circuit. Legislation would
be necessary to permit transfers at the court of appeals level
of cases litigated in the district courts, 2 30 though it should be
noted that under "extraordinary circumstances" a court of
appeals has power to transfer a case from a district within its
21
own circuit to a district in another circuit.
228 Compare, e.g., Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 94 S. Ct. 2328 (1974), with Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487
F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nom. Shell Oil Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 94 S. Ct. 3166 (1974) (Texas Gulf Coast cases). The Fifth Circuit proceedings
included several petitions transferred by the District of Columbia Circuit, see Municipal
Distrib. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1972), while the Texas Gulf Coast
cases included petitions which the District of Columbia court refused to transfer to the
Fifth Circuit. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Fifth Circuit case after the Solicitor General
emphasized the importance of resolving the conflict. See Memorandum for Respondent at 11-15, Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, No. 73-437 (U.S., filed Sept. 10, 1973). After affirming the Fifth Circuit's decision, Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 94 S. Ct. 2328 (1974), the
Court granted certiorari in the District of Columbia cases and remanded them for
reconsideration in the light of the Mobil Oil decision. Shell Oil Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 94 S. Ct. 3166 (1974).
229 See Cooper, Administrative Law: The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J.
945 (1958). It is possible that with the courts of appeals expanded to memberships
of nine and even more, differences between circuits have become less pronounced.
Nevertheless, in labor cases unions continue to seek review in the District of Columbia
Circuit, while employers attempt to file their petitions in circuits believed to be
more favorable to their contentions. See, e.g., Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d
1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1973); cf. Commission Hearings, supra note 23, Washington, D.C.,
April 2, 1974, at 80 (testimony of Dean Griswold):
We now have a strange system of review of Federal Trade Commission
decisions under which there is a mad scramble to get into one court of appeals or another before anybody else does, which is largely motivated by the
fact that counsel knows that one court of appeals will be more favorable to
them than another will be.
220 See text accompanying notes 370-72 infra.
231 Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 382 U.S. 362 (1966).
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Transfers of Venue under Section 1404(a)

Under section 1404(a),2 3 2 a district court may transfer
any civil action "to any other district . . . where it might have
been brought," including, of course, districts in another circuit. The only statutory criteria, assuming that the action is
one that "might have been brought" in the transferee district, 233 are the requirements that the transfer be "[flor the
convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of
justice. ' 234 The proposed Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of
1973235 would, in general, make transfers more readily available.
The importance of section 1404(a) for present purposes
is twofold. First, it creates a mechanism for the transfer of
cases that often operates to avoid parallel litigation in two
or more circuits and thus the possibility of inconsistent determinations. Numerous cases have held that although the pendency of other similar actions in the proposed transferee
district is not alone sufficient to justify a transfer, it is a persuasive factor in considering whether a motion for transfer
should be granted.2 36 The rationale has been summarized by
Judge Weinfeld:
There is a strong policy favoring the litigation of related claims in the same tribunal in order that: (1)
pretrial discovery can be conducted more efficiently;
(2) the witnesses can be saved time and money, both
with respect to pretrial and trial proceedings; (3) duplicitous litigation can be avoided, thereby eliminating
unnecessary expense to the parties and at the [same]
time serving the237public interest; (4) inconsistent results
can be avoided.
222 28 U.S.C. §

1404(a) (1970). See generally H. HART & H.

WECHSLER, supra

note 27, at 1133-34; C. WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 162-70.
233 For discussion of the limitation imposed by the words "where it might have
been brought," see Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616-26 (1964); Hoffman
v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 1135-36.234 Although the word "and" is not in the statute, the courts have interpreted
the provision as though it were. See Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code, 40
IND. L.J. 99, n.1 (1965).
235S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 1305, 1306, 1315 (1973); see ALI STUDY,
supra note 148, at 150-55, 222-24.
231See cases cited in Annot., 1 A.L.R. FED. 15, 75-80 (1969).
217 Schneider v. Sears, 265 F. Supp. 257, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (footnote
omitted). See also Jacobs v. Tenney, 316 F. Supp. 151, 169 (D. Del. 1970).
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Second, use of the transfer mechanism as a means of
avoiding duplicative litigation is not dependent on an identity
of parties in the various suits initially brought in the transferor
and transferee courts. Thus, when similar stockholders' derivative suits 23 8 or class actions 23 9 have been brought in two

districts by separate groups of plaintiffs, the courts have transferred one of the actions to the district that was otherwise
more appropriate for the particular litigation. Such transfers
have been ordered despite the objections of the second-action
plaintiffs who were thereby denied their choice of forum.
Typically these objections are answered by citation to the
Supreme Court's comment in a stockholder's derivative action: "[W]here there are hundreds of potential plaintiffs, . . .
all of whom could with equal show of right go into their many
home courts, the claim of any one plaintiff that a forum is
appropriate merely because it is his home forum is considerably weakened.

3.

2 40

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

In 1968, building upon the experience in handling pretrial discovery in the electrical equipment antitrust cases ,241
Congress created a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
Under the new section 1407,242 when civil actions involving
one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, the Panel may transfer those actions "to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings."
Transfers are not limited by venue requirements or by the
rules governing in personam jurisdiction.
Although the statute assumes that once the pretrial proceedings are completed, the actions will be remanded to the
districts from which they were transferred, this has not hapInconsistent results might occur despite transfer unless the transferee court is
free to apply its own interpretation of the applicable law to all of the cases before
it even though a different rule prevails in the transferor court. For a discussion of
the freedom of transferee courts to apply their own interpretation of law, see text
accompanying notes 315-42 infra.
238E.g., Schlusselberg v. Werly, 274 F. Supp. 758, 763-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
259 E.g., Schneider v. Sears, 265 F. Supp. 257, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Freiman
1965).
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 38 F.R.D. 336, 338 (N.D. Ill.
240 Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947). This case was
cited in, e.g., Schneider v. Sears, 265 F. Supp. 257, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
241 See

Neal

& Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases, 50 A.B.A.J.

621 (1964).
242 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
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pened; rather, the practical result of transfer under section
1407 has been a trartsfer for all purposes, including trial on
the merits if one is held.2 43 One. writer suggests the reasons
for this development:
[I]f there is a trial on the merits, it is usually more
convenient for all parties to prosecute the action in
the transferee court. The judge has handled the case
for a long period of time and is familiar with the
facts. The counsel on each side have developed
working arrangements which promote the interests
of.their respective clients. Therefore the parties may
stipulate to in personam
jurisdiction and venue in the
2 44
transferee court.

Even if the parties do not consent to a consolidated trial
in the transferee district, other procedures can presently be
used to achieve the efficiencies of centralized management
after the completion of pretrial proceedings. For instance, the
transferee judge selected by the Panel can be assigned to the
transferor districts to try the cases there after remand. 245 In
the alternative, and to the extent permitted by venue rules,
actions can be transferred to a single district under section
243 Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1001, 1017 & n.78, 1028-36 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Multidistrict Litigation]; Note, Consolidation and Transfer in the Federal Courts, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1289,
1326 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Consolidation]; Comment, The Experience of Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 588, 607 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Transferee Courts]. But see In re Air Crash Disaster at Greater
Cincinnati Airport, 354 F. Supp. 275 (J.P.M.L. 1973).
2144
Consolidation, supra note 243, at 1326.
When the bill creating the Multidistrict Litigation Panel was before Congress,
the House Report noted that the bill was drafted so that it could easily be amended
to provide for consolidating multidistrict litigation for trial on the merits, if efficiency so demanded. H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); see Transferee Courts, supra nofe 243, at 611. After surveying the experience of courts under
the present law, two recent commentators have suggested that this step be taken.
Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 243, at 1037; Transferee Courts, supra note 243, at
611. Cases would be transferred in appropriate circumstances without regard to
the venue rules. Cf. S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (providing for transfer of
all actions arising out of an airline disaster to a single district). It is interesting to
note the assertion of one writer that "[b]y providing for a federal common law,
Senate Bill 961 attempts to avoid choice of law problems inherent in mass multidistrict tort litigation." Comment, The Search for the Most Convenient Federal Forum,
64 Nw. U.L. REV. 188, 201 (1969). This assumes, of course, that inter-circuit conflicts
on the "federal common law" would not lead to choice of law problems. See text
accompanying
notes 315-42 infra.
24
"Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 243, at 1017-18; Transferee Courts, supra
note 243, at 610.
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1404(a) and consolidated for a trial on the merits. 2 46 Finally,
when venue rules preclude the transfer of all pending actions
to a single district, it may be possible to hold a trial on the
merits that will conclusively determine all of the issues for most
of the parties. In the recent yarn processing patent validity
litigation, 247 the Panel emphasized this possibility in selecting the transferee district for pretrial proceedings. Although
many typical choice of forum factors favored the Eastern District of New York, the majority chose the Southern District of
Florida because, as one commentator put it, "all of the issues
and most of the parties would be subject to a decision on the
merits there. 2 4 8
However consolidation for trial is achieved-by Panel
decision, through the consent of the parties, or under new
statutory transfer provisions-the judgments in the multidistrict actions will all be reviewed by one court of appeals. Consequently, the procedures developed under section 1407 and
supplemented by section 1404(a) can be used to avoid not
only repetitive litigation but also inconsistent judgments.
Quite apart from the various devices used to consolidate
cases for trial in the transferee district, it is currently possible
to achieve unitary review of questions of law in multidistrict
cases. The reason is that the transferee court, through its control of the pretrial proceedings, has the power to rule on pretrial motions, including motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment. 24 9 Appellate review of the court's decision
then lies in the court of appeals for the transferee district.
"Consequently, coordination at the appellate level will also be
achieved in one Court of Appeals .... -250 For instance, in ordering the transfer to a single district of more than a score of
actions seeking damages for the infringement of the Butterfield patent, the Panel commented, "[I]f discovery . . .reveals
no dispute of any material fact, disposition of the litigation
246Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 243, at 1018.
247 In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 341 F. Supp. 376, 381-82
(J.P.M.L. 1972).
248 MultidistrictLitigation, supra note 243, at 1025.
24"See, e.g., In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, 328 F. Supp. 513, 514 (J.P.M.L.
1970); In re Fourth Class Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326, 1328 (J.P.M.L. 1969);
In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 490-96 (J.P.M.L. 1968); Transferee
Courts, supra note 243, at 601-03; cf. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d
191 (9th Cir. 1973).
250In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484. 495 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
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by summary judgment may be appropriate.... [T]he result on
any such motion would be the same for all parties .... 251
The Panel cited its earlier decision ordering the transfer of a
group of actions brought in several districts seeking to enjoin
252
the enforcement of certain fourth class postal regulations.
In that case, the Panel found "a special reason" 253 for ordering
the transfers: many of the plaintiffs had sought temporary
restraining orders or preliminary injunctions. These had been
granted in some districts and denied in others. Noting that
avoidance of inconsistent decisions has been recognized as a
basis for transfer under section 1404(a), the Panel said, "Similarly, during the course of multidistrict litigation, § 1407 is an
appropriate means of avoiding injury to like parties caused
by inconsistent judicial treatment. 2 5 4 Perhaps most interesting, the Panel emphasized the power of the transferee court
to rule on the legal arguments urged by the plaintiffs. These
arguments were to be raised by motions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and for failure to state a
claim for relief. "Disposition of these motions by a single
judge," the Panel stated, "will conserve judicial time and energy
255
and minimize the likelihood of inconsistent results.
Section 1407, of course, authorizes the transfer of cases
only when they share one or more questions of fact, and the
Panel has refused to transfer cases where the only common
questions were questions of law.2 56 At the same time, however,
the Panel has given an expansive interpretation to the requirement of common questions of fact. One writer has even suggested that the Panel has used the presence of common, but
not very important, questions of fact as a "pretext" for the
unified resolution of common questions of law. 257 However
that may be, the general policy of transferring cases wherever
possible in order to avoid conflicting decisions on questions
of law appears consistent with the intent of the drafters of
251 In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, 328 F. Supp. 513, 514 (1970).
252 In re Fourth Class Postal Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
252
Id. at 1327.
254Id.
255
Id. at 1328.
256 See, e.g., In re Pension Fund Class Action Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 1400
(J.P.M.L. 1973).
257 Transferee Courts, supra note 243, at 603. See also Multidistrict Litigation, supra
note 243, at 1004 n.15.
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section 1407. Dean Phil C. Neal, one of the authors of the
legislation, testified at the Senate hearings:
I think, for example, about the various rulings
on questions of law which came up early in the electrical equipment cases such as the tolling of the statute
of limitations, the effect of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, the effect of the pleas of nolo contendere and so on.
[T]here would certainly be an advantage in
having only one court decide those questions instead
of having to get dozens of different decisions in different courts with conflicts eventually resolved by
58
appeal.2
4.

Injunctions Against Litigation

It is generally accepted today that
when a case is brought in one federal district court,
and the case so brought embraces essentially the same
*tra .sactios as thoe in a case Pending in anothe
federal district court, the latter court may enjoin the
suitor in the more recently commenced case from
taking any further action in the prosecution of that
case.

259

As this statement may suggest, injunctions against litigation
are ordinarily issued against persons who are parties to an
action pending in the court which issues the injunction. 260 The
power is not limited to such situations, however; in at least
one important class of cases-interpleader suits under section
1335 2 6t'-a court may enjoin litigation by all persons claiming
an interest in the money or property which is the subject of
the litigation, whether or not those persons are initially parties
2 62
to the interpleader suit.
In a leading decision ordering a district court to grant an
injunction, the Third Circuit, speaking through Judge Maris,
22 8

In Re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 491 n.1 (J.P.M.L. 1968).

229 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 1961).
260See, e.g., Austin v. Texas-Ohio Gas Co., 218 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1955);

Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 867-68 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
26128 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
262 See text accompanying notes 276-81 infra.
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emphasized the undesirability of "duplicating litigation"; 263
but also noted that if multiple lawsuits were permitted, they
might result in conflicting decisions, which in turn might require separate appeals to different circuits. 26 4 The opinion
thus recognized that the injunction might have the effect, and
perhaps the purpose, of avoiding conflict at the court of appeals level.
5. Stays of Proceedings
Like the injunction, the stay of proceedings in a second
court has the purpose of avoiding duplicative litigation, often
with the effect of preventing conflicting judgments. The cases
hold that a federal district court has inherent power to stay
proceedings before it to await the disposition of an action
pending in another district. 26 5 In virtually all of the many
reported cases in which that power has been exercised, the
two actions have involved the same parties, but, as with the
injunction, the power is not limited to such situations. The
point is illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Landis
v. North American Co., 266 a case of particular relevance to the divided state situation. A group of holding companies brought
suit in the District of Columbia to enjoin enforcement of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.267 Among the
defendants were members of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. On the same day, the Commission filed a bill of
complaint in the Southern District of New York to compel
another group of holding companies to register with the Commission in accordance with the statute. In both courts the crucial issue was the constitutionality of the Act. A motion was
then filed on behalf of the Commission to stay the proceedings in the District of Columbia until the validity of the Act
262 Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941).
264

Id.

26 See, e.g.,

Powell v. American Export Lines, 146 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).

The considerations relevant to the granting of a stay are similar to those bearing
on the appropriateness of an injunction. See Texaco, Inc. v. Borda, 383 F.2d 607,
608-09 (3d Cir. 1967); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 47 (2d
Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting); Rosenfeld v. Schwitzer Corp., 251 F. Supp.
758, 763-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Puritan Sportswear Corp. v. Puritan Fashions Corp.,
232 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); cf. Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 289

F. Supp. 353, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
266 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
267 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1970).
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had been determined in the New York case. The district court
granted the motion, and the Supreme Court held that it had
not abused its discretion in doing so. Justice Cardozo stated:
[S]ome courts have stated broadly that, irrespective
of particular conditions, there is no power by a stay
to compel an unwilling litigant to wait upon the outcome of a controversy to which he is a stranger ...
Such a formula ... is too mechanical and narrow.
• . .
Especially in cases of extraordinary public
moment, the individual may be required to submit
to delay not immoderate in extent and not oppressive
in its consequences if the public welfare or conve-

26 8
nience will thereby be promoted.

The Supreme Court then held that the stay could be extended
only until the district court in the New York litigation had
rendered its first decision.
Justice Cardozo's opinion appears to assume that the
issue of the constitutionality of the Public Utility Holding Company Act would ultimately be determined by the Supreme
Court. That assumption could not be made about all issues of
federal law today. Nevertheless, a stay of proceedings by one
court would still permit the sorting out and simplification of
the common issues in the other court. Moreover, the disposition in the first case might satisfy all parties, obviating the
need for further proceedings in the second action. Thus, while
the stay is no panacea for inconsistent judgments, it may be
effective in many of the situations in which inconsistent judgments would otherwise be possible.26 9
6.

Service of Process in Another Circuit

Under present law, a district court in a state containing
more than one federal judicial district may issue process to
be served anywhere within the state, not only within its own
district. 270 Unless the law were changed, this would mean that
a district court in a state bifurcated between circuits would
regularly be issuing process to be served outside its circuit.
2611299 U.S. at 255-56.
'26 See Schechter v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding case
pending final resolution of Third Circuit case raising same issue).
270 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
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There would be no reason to change the rule, however. It is
hardly anomalous today for a court to issue process to be
served outside of its territorial jurisdiction; both state and
27 1
federal courts do so routinely under state long-arm statutes.
Moreover, in a limited class of cases, federal district courts
are permitted to serve process outside the state in which the
court sits but within 100 miles of the place where the action is
tried. 272 The purpose of this rule, in the words of the Advisory
Committee, is "to promote the objective of enabling the court
to determine entire controversies.1 27 3 The effect is to empower

district courts to extend their reach even into another circuit,
to permit unitary litigation.
The "bulge service" provision is especially noteworthy
because its drafters were explicitly attempting to foster unitary
litigation in "metropolitan areas spanning more than one
State. '2 74 This situation is analogous to that of a state spanning
more than one circuit. In both instances, the controversy underlying the litigation cuts across jurisdictional lines; in both
instances, one jurisdiction ought to be able to reach out into
the other (consistently, of course, with the requirements of
due process) to settle the controversy in a single proceeding.
Finally, service of process outside the circuit of the district
court issuing the process would probably raise no constitutional problems, since the Supreme Court has suggested that
Congress could, if it wished, authorize federal courts to serve
275
process anywhere in the United States.
7.

Statutory Interpleader

Although the rules of party joinder have already been
mentioned, special note should be taken of the Federal Interpleader Act. 27 6 Interpleader is designed to avoid the possibil271 Rule 4(f) permits federal courts to utilize state long-arm statutes.
272 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). Similar provision is made in FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e) for

the service of a subpoena for a hearing or trial. Bulge service supplements the authority which federal courts have to utilize state long-arm statutes.
2 3
' Advisory Committee's Note, 31 F.R.D. 627, 629 (1963) (FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)).
Id.
275 Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (dictum).
274

When the bulge service provision was first added to the federal rules, its constitutionality was challenged in several cases. The challenges were uniformly rejected,
primarily on the authority of Mississippi Publishing Co. See Annot., 8 A.L.R. FED.

784, 793 (1971). See also Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405
F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968).
276 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1970).
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ity that a litigant will be subjected to two or more judgments
upholding competing and inconsistent claims to a single fund
or obligation.2 7 7 Two aspects of the statutory scheme are of
special interest here. First, as in any interpleader proceeding,
the initiative rests with the person who fears inconsistent judgments. The principle-though not the statute itself-might
therefore suggest a means whereby a state administrative officer who fears multiple lawsuits seeking to compel changes in
his agency's practices could bring all the potential challengers
into a single proceeding and thus avoid the risk of inconsistent orders.

27 8

Second, to ensure the effectiveness of statutory interpleader, the statute provides that a district court may issue
process to all claimants anywhere in the United States, and
that once process is issued, the court may restrain the claimants
from instituting or prosecuting a proceeding in any court,
state or federal, affecting the property or obligation involved
in the interpleader action. 27 9 This provision, too, suggests a way

of avoiding inconsistent orders against a state administrative
officer in the bifurcated state. Obviously, the concept of a
"claim" would have to be broadened, and provision would have
to be made for notice to all potential claimants. Procedures
evolved for the class action 280 may provide useful guidance in

2 81
the development of notice mechanisms.

B. Mechanisms for Avoiding or Resolving Conflicts in Interpretation
of State Law: Abstention and Certification
For reasons discussed earlier, issues of state law-whether
in diversity cases or in other contexts-probably have the least
potential for giving rise to troublesome conflicts if the judicial
districts of California are divided between the Ninth and the
Twelfth Circuits.2 82 Nevertheless, a good deal of apprehension
277 This is a somewhat oversimplified statement of the purpose of an interpleader proceeding. For a more extensive analysis, see Hazard & Moskovitz, supra
note 18, at 750-63.
278 Consider the action of Southern Illinois University in bringing a class action
against faculty members fired in a budgetary crisis. The university sought a judgment holding that the civil rights of 106 discharged employees had not been violated.
Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1974, at A-3, col. 1.
27!928 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970).
280 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
281 The literature on notice provisions in class actions is extensive. See 7A C.

WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 196, §§ 1786-88.
282 See text accompanying notes 26-71 supra.
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has been expressed in this regard, and it may be worthwhile
to consider briefly mechanisms for avoiding such conflicts.
The first of these is abstention. While abstention is associated in many minds with cases involving the federal validity
of state statutes, 283 it is by no means limited to such cases. Abstention may be ordered in a variety of situations sharing the
common characteristic that a federal-court decision may turn
on an issue of state law which "cannot be satisfactorily determined in the light of the state authorities.1 284 To be sure,

resort to abstention in diversity cases has aroused great controversy; the Fifth Circuit's Delaney decision, 28 5 under which
abstention is freely ordered in cases involving important and
unsettled questions of state law, has been extensively criticized, 28 6 and the scope of the doctrine generally is by no means
clear. 28 7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recently reaf-

firmed the proposition that "[s]ound judicial administration"
may require abstention under at least some circumstances in
diversity cases. 28 8 Abstention cannot, then, be dismissed as a
means of avoiding conflicting decisions between the two circuits on issues of state law (outside of the context of federal
constitutional adjudication), but neither can it be expected to
play a significant role.
A more promising device is that of certification. In its
report, the Commission notes that "if it were thought that the
federal courts were having undue difficulty in interpreting

See text accompanying notes 65-70 supra.
ALl STUDY, supra note 148, at 289.
285 United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964); see also
the separate opinion of Brown, C.J., sitting by designation in W.S. Ranch Co. v.
Kaiser Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257, 262 (10th Cir. 1967), rev'd per curiam, 391 U.S.
593 (1968).
2
11See authorities collected in C. WRIGHT, supra note 32, § 52 n.51.
287 See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 998-1005.
288 Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968) (per curiam).
See also id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring). For an exhaustive exegesis of the deci282

284

sion, see Comment, The Need for More Definitive Standards in the Employment of Federal
Court Abstention, 14 UTAH L. REV. 196 (1969). The authors, attempting to extract
standards from the Court's brief and cryptic opinion, note that the
Court identified four circumstances justifying federal abstention: the crucial
issue involved was of 'vital concern' to the arid state of New Mexico; the issue
was a 'truly novel one'; a declaratory judgment was 'actually pending in
the state courts'; and abstention would allow the federal court litigants 'the
benefit of the same rule of law' as state court litigants and, thus, would be
in the interest of 'sound judicial administration.'
Id. 201.
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state law,' '2 8 9 the state legislature could provide for certification
to state courts of doubtful issues of state law. Like abstention,
certification has received a mixed reception in the courts and
the literature, 290 but on this point the enthusiasts appear to
predominate. "[T]he weight of scholarly opinion" 29 1 is that
certification "not only achieves the objective of abstentionto prevent federal invasion of the state law-making function
and to avoid needless federal-state friction-but also represents a more perfect attempt at cooperative judicial federalism,
through a
since concern for state sovereignty is implemented
2 92
proceeding.
simpler
and
more efficient
During the current term the Supreme Court seized an
opportunity to add its voice to those endorsing the certification procedure. In Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 29 3 the Court granted certiorari to review a decision of the Second Circuit in a
trio of cases turning on a novel and unsettled question of
Florida corporate law. 2 :9 4 Review was limited to the issue whether the court of appeals erred "in not certifying- the qtestion
of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to
Florida's certification procedure. ''2 ' 5 Echoing the comments
of scholars, the Court declared that use of the certification
device "does of course in the long run save time, energy, and
296
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism.
2" See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 239. At the Commission's hearings,
a question was raised whether the California Supreme Court could constitutionally
answer certified questions without running afoul of the rule against advisory opinions. Commission Hearings, supra note 23, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 31, 1973, at 23
(testimony of G.W. Shea, Esq.). A similar argument was rejected by the Washington
Supreme Court in In re Elliot, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 610-11, 446 P.2d 347, 354-55 (1968).
The same objection was initially raised to the enactment of declaratory judgment
statutes; it is therefore relevant that the California courts, unlike those of various
other jurisdictions, have been hospitable to the concept of declaratory relief. See
Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931); Blakeslee v. Wilson, 190
Cal. 479, 213 P. 495 (1923); 15 CAL. JUR. 2d DeclaratoryRelief § 4 (1954).
299 Compare, e.g., Lillich & Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law
Questions, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 888 (1971) (favorable), with Mattis, Certification of
Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 717 (1969).
291 Lillich & Mundy, supra note 290, at 899.
2192Note, Inter-JurisdictionalCertification, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 350 (1963).
293 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974).
294 Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).

2"' Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 568, granting cert. to Schein v. Chasen, 478
F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit's refusal to certify the question of
Florida law is criticized in 87 HARV. L. REV. 675, 684-86 (1974).
296 94 S. Ct. at 1744 & n.8.
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In the case before it, the Court continued, resort to certification "would seem particularly appropriate in view of the novelty of the question and the great unsettlement of Florida law,
Florida being a distant State." At the same time, apparently
mindful that in the federal system the primary responsibility
for interpreting state law rests with the lower courts,2 9 7 the
Court emphasized that the use of the procedure in a given case
"rests in the sound discretion of the federal court. '2 98 There-

fore, rather than holding that the court of appeals did or did
not err, the Court remanded the case so that the court of appeals could "reconsider" the advisability of certification. 29 9 The
import of the decision was further clouded by the Court's failure to indicate to what extent its reluctance to dictate the use
of the procedure rested on the unique character of diversity
litigation; the possibility remains that the lower courts may be
accorded less discretion in cases where state law issues arise
3
in other contexts.

00

Whatever the scope of the Court's decision, however, it
bears emphasizing that neither abstention nor certification
would be necessary for the overwhelming majority of the state
law issues that arise in diversity cases, because either the law will
be too clear to give rise to a conflict or the uncertainties will be
resolved by the California courts without the need for special
federal-state mechanisms. 30 1 If undue difficulties should arise,
30 2
the certification route remains open to the legislature.
2"7Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court, and the Erie Doctrine in
Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 216 (1957).
298 94 S.Ct. at 1744.
299

Id.

300In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist laid heavy emphasis on the fact
that Lehman Brothers was a "purely diversity case," id. at 1746, and implied that he
might narrow the discretion where the choice "trench[ed] upon the fundamentals of
our federal-state jurisprudence." Id. Cf Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207
(1960). Although Clay, too, was a diversity case, federal constitutional questions lurked
beneath the issues of state law that were ultimately certified to the Florida Supreme
Court. See Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 377
U.S. 179 (1964). In Clay, the Court gave strong support to certification, 363 U.S. at
212, and it is difficult to explain Justice Rehnquist's observation in Lehman Brothers
that "the Court has today for thefirst time expressed its view as to the use of certification procedures by the federal courts." 94 S.Ct. at 1746 (emphasis added).
"' For a recent case in which a three judge district court declined to invoke
a certification procedure after concluding that the "possibilities of unseemly conflict"
between federal and state courts were "remote," see Bay State Harness Horse Racing
& Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Mass. 1973).
302 judge Ben C. Duniway of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
said, "I would guess that if California were divided between two circuits there would
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C. Mechanismsfor Avoiding or Resolving Conflicting Decisions
on the Validity of a State Law
Whatever its merits in other respects, the Commission's
plan is likely to encounter rough sledding in Congress unless
the bar and the public in California feel confident that the
validity of state laws will not be left in limbo by conflicting
decisions in the two circuits. However infrequently such conflicts might arise, their consequences are widely regarded as
serious enough that it is necessary to find ways of avoiding or
resolving them if the realignment plan is to be found acceptable. As the Commission emphasizes, however, existing mechanisms can go a long way to achieving those purposes, and a
wide variety of new mechanisms might be devised. 0 3 In the
following pages, emphasis will be placed on devices for which
precedents 'are available, for unless a procedure has been
tried and found effective in comparable circumstances, it is
not likely to win the confidence of those who are apprehensive
about the consequences of bifurcating the state.
1. Limitations on Venue
Several witnesses at the Commission's hearings suggested
that one way to avoid inter-circuit conflicts with respect to the
validity of state laws would be through restrictions on venue.
It would be possible, for instance, to require that actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against the enforcement of
a state statute or administrative regulation be brought in the
district in which the state capital is situated. 30 4 Such a provision, however, would not affect the cases in which the federal
validity of a state law is challenged in some other legal context,
such as a habeas corpus action 30 5 or a suit between private litigants. 306 Nor would it, or any other venue statute Congress
be little difficulty in persuading the California legislature to adopt the Florida [certification] procedure.
...
He adds, "This is only one of the many ways in which the
problem envisaged, if it should arise, could be taken care of." Letter from Judge
Ben C. Duniway to Attorney General William B. Saxbe, Feb. 8, 1974, on file at the
Commission.
303 See CommissioN REPORT, supra note 3, at 238-40.
304 See Commission Hearings, supra note 23, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30, 1973, at
91 (testimony of Professor Stolz); id. 42 (testimony of Judge Duniway).
"0 See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 94 S.Ct. 1242 (1974).
306 See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 612, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1973).
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is likely to enact, reach local ordinances that are in wide use
30 7
throughout the state.
Even if one could draft a venue statute encompassing such
cases, or if a statute reaching only the one class of cases were
deemed adequate, strong policy arguments would militate
against its enactment. A venue limitation of the kind suggested
would run counter to the congressional policy embodied in
the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,08 which removed prior
limitations on the venue of suits against federal government
officials acting in their official capacities.3 0 9 To be sure, requiring a San Diego welfare client to bring suit in Sacramento
to challenge a ruling of the state welfare commissioner may
be thought significantly less burdensome than requiring challengers of federal action to sue in the District of Columbia;
yet most Californians are likely to share the view of Professor
Preble Stolz that "[i]t would be a first class nuisance to [people
in the metropolitan centers of San Francisco and Los Angeles]
to have to go to Sacramento to litigate. '' 310 Moreover, it must
be acknowledged that people in southern California might not
take kindly to the prospect that the validity of state legislation
would always be tested, as far as the federal courts become
involved, 3 11 in the northern circuit. For these reasons, whatever the theoretical merits of a venue limitation as a device
for avoiding conflicts, the political and practical objections
seem to be insurmountable.
2.

Transfer and Consolidation
One way of avoiding parallel constitutional adjudications
without permanently shutting out either the northern or the
southern circuit would be through the transfer and, where
appropriate, the consolidation of actions brought in district
courts in the two circuits. Such transfers might be effected at
either the district court or the court of appeals level. Use of
307 See Commission Hearings, supra note 23, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30, 1973, at
106 (testimony of Professor Mishkin).
308 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1970). The cases construing § 1391(e) are collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R. FED. 719 (1971). But see O'Keefe v. New York City Bd. of
Elections, 246 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (constitutional challenge to Voting
Rights Act of 1965 could not be brought in local forum).
309 See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 1385-90.
310 Commission Hearings, supra note 23, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30, 1973, at 91
(testimony of Professor Stolz).
31'See note 207 supra & accompanying text.
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the transfer device is possible today in some kinds of cases;
mechanisms of broader application can be devised, drawing
upon the experience of courts in dealing with multidistrict
litigation, 312 transfers of venue under section 1404(a), 31 3 and
transfers of petitions for review of administrative agency
31 4
orders.
a. Law to be Applied
An important preliminary question is whether the court
to which an action is transferred (the transferee court) is free
to decide the transferred case according to the precedents of
its circuit and its own view of the law, or whether, on the contrary, it must apply the law that would have been applied by the
court where the action was initially brought (the transferor
court). Unless the transferee court can apply a uniform rule
of law to the various cases before it, transfers will lose most
of their utility as a device for avoiding conflicting decisions,
though they might still be desirable as a means of achieving
economies for courts and litigants. 31 5
Although questions of the law to be applied after a change
of venue have been litigated frequently in the federal courts
with respect to issues governed by state law, 31 6 there is little
authority on the law to be applied by the transferee court with
respect to issues of federal law. 31 7 Recently the point was raised

MSee text accompanying notes 241-58 supra.
M13
See text accompanying notes 232-40 supra.
3'4See text accompanying notes 209-31 supra.
315

See text accompanying note 237 supra.

"'6 See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 1139-40.
317 The question was raised by the petition for certiorari in Morgan v. Auto-

mobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), denying cert. to In re Multidistrict Vehicle
Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973). Petitioner, a California
farmer, filed a private antitrust action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against
the domestic automobile manufacturers, alleging a conspiracy to suppress the development of air pollution control technology. Numerous similar suits were pending
in districts throughout the country. Acting upon its own initiative, the Multidistrict
Litigation Panel consolidated all of the actions for coordinated pretrial proceedings
in the Central District of California. In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 311 F. Supp. 1349 (J.P.M.L. 1970). The defendants then moved to dismiss the
actions for lack of standing to sue under section four of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1970). The district court denied the motions, but the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed. In re Multidistrict Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122,
129-30 (9th Cir. 1973). Petitioner then sought certiorari, arguing, inter alia, that the
Ninth Circuit erred in applying its own law of standing to a case filed in a district in
the Third Circuit and consolidated for pretrial purposes in a district in the Ninth
Circuit. Petition for Certiorari at 10-13. He contended, first, that section 1407 did
not authorize "the consolidation forum .. .to contravene the law applied in the origi-
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before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in one
phase of the plumbing fixtures antitrust litigation. 3 8 After
a series of transfers over a period of four years, approximately
370 actions were pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The State of North Carolina then filed an action in the Eastern
District of North Carolina. Pursuant to the Panel's rules for
"tag-along" cases, 3 19 the clerk of the Panel entered a conditional order transferring North Carolina's suit to the Pennsylvania court. The defendants supported the transfer, but the
state resisted, solely because of its fear that the transferee
court would apply Third Circuit law, rather than Fourth Circuit law, in deciding whether the state could maintain a treble
damage action against the particular defendants under section
nal court and dismiss a complaint," id. at 11; and, second, that application of Third
Circuit law was required by Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Id. at 11-13.
As already noted, however, the drafters of section 1407 clearly intended to empower the consolidation court to rule on motions raising substantive issues, so as to
"[h]ave only one court decide those questions instead of . . .dozens of different decisions in different courts." See note 249 supra & accompanying text. This purpose
could not be accomplished unless the consolidation forum-at both trial and appellate level-could apply a single rule of law to all of the cases before it. For reasons
given in the text, the decision in Van Dusen v. Barrack does not dictate a contrary resuit.
Petitioner's argument also seems inapposite in the circumstances of the particular case. The point was raised for the first time in the petition for certiorari. In
his brief in the Ninth Circuit, far from contending that Third Circuit law controlled,
petitioner had urged the court to rely on principles established in Ninth Circuit
cases. Brief for Respondents at 9, Morgan v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045
(1973) (quoting Brief for Appellees at 22, In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution
M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973)). Even in the Supreme Court, petitioner
did not argue that application of the Third Circuit's standing test would compel a
different result in his case, see Petition for Certiorari, supra, at 13-14; indeed, after
analyzing the cases in the various circuits, a noted authority has concluded that
"the doctrinal alignment of the Courts of Appeal is not hard and fast, and equivalent
results can be reached in most cases under either the 'target area' test or the 'direct
injury' test, or under a combination of the tests sometimes encountered." L. SCHWARTZ,
INTER-CIRCUIT CONFLICT AND RELATED UNCERTAINTY

OF LAW IN THE ANTITRUST FIELD

6 (1974) (on file at the Commission). Finally, petitioner's concern about "forum
shopping between circuits," Petition for Certiorari, supra, at 12, came with ill grace
"from a California citizen and resident, normally governed by Ninth Circuit decisions, who claim[ed] to be subject . . . to 'Third Circuit law' [only] because he
chose to file his complaint in a federal court in Philadelphia." Brief for Respondents,
supra, at 8. Although it is possible that petitioner brought his action in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania because the law there was thought to be more favorable to
his claims, this seems unlikely, since the Ninth Circuit was regarded as more "liberal," at least on the standing issue, than the Third. See L. SCHWARTZ, supra, 6-7. It
seems more probable that the forum was chosen because petitioner's attorneys practice in Philadelphia. Cf. note 79 supra & accompanying text.
38
In re Plumbing Fixtures Litigation, 342 F. Supp. 756 (J.P.M.L. 1972).
3 1
' SeeJ.P.M.L.R. 1,12, 53 F.R.D. 119-20, 123 (1971).
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four of the Clayton Act. 320 The state expressed the belief that
the Third Circuit had interpreted the requirements of the Act
32 1
less favorably to antitrust plaintiffs than the Fourth Circuit.
The Panel granted the transfer nonetheless, asserting that
the state's fears were "groundless," because "[i]t is clear that
the substantive law of the transferor forum will apply after
transfer ....
,"322 The point was not developed; the only author3 23
ity cited was Van Dusen v. Barrack.
Barrack was a diversity case decided by the Supreme Court
in 1964. The Court held that "in cases such as the present,
where the defendants seek transfer, the transferee district
court must be obligated to apply the state law that would have
been applied if there had been no change of venue. ' 32 4 As
this quotation indicates, the Court was careful to limit its holding to situations where a defendant seeks a transfer under section 1404(a). 2 5 In support of its conclusion, the Court emphasized that a contrary holding would permit a defendant to "get
a change of law as a bonus for a change of venue. '326 This
rationale, however, would not necessarily apply if the initiative
for the change of venue came not from the defendants, but
from an impartial tribunal concerned primarily with judicial
efficiency and the avoidance of conflicts.32 7 For this reason
alone, it is questionable whether the Panel was justified in
assuming without discussion that the ruling in Barrack would
apply to an antitrust action transferred under section 1407.
There is a more important reason, however, for thinking
that the Barrack decision does not necessarily preclude the
application of a uniform rule of law by a transferee court
when issues of federal law are involved. A reading of the opinion makes clear that the Supreme Court addressed itself only
to the question of the state law to be applied after a change of
320 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
321Cf In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197, 198 n.6 (9th Cir.
1973).
322 342 F. Supp. at 758. The Panel noted that the transferee court had "expressly
affirmed this point," id. (citing Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1969)).
323 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
324 Id. at 639.

32.See id. at 639-40.
326Id. at 635-36.
327 Cf., e.g., In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 311 F. Supp.
1349 (J.P.M.L. 1970) (transfer to single district under § 1407 considered by Panel
on own initiative); In re Kaehni Patent, 311 F. Supp. 1342 (J.P.M.L. 1970) (Panel
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venue. 2 8 While some of the Court's comments suggest a
principle applicable to both kinds of issues,3 2 9 that interpretation is undercut by the Court's reliance on "the policy underlying Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.

' 33 °

The Court emphasized that

"the 'accident' of federal diversity jurisdiction [should] not
enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal
court which could not have been achieved in the courts of the
State where the action was filed."' 33' By its own terms, this

rationale would not apply to cases brought in federal courts
because of the federal question involved, or to the issues of
federal law on which such cases turn.
The distinction between the two kinds of issues was
brought into sharp focus by the Second Circuit's decision in
H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon,332 a case cited with approval in
Barrack.3 33 In an opinion by Chief Judge Lumbard, the court,

following the reasoning that the Supreme Court would later
accept, held that section 1404(a) could not be used by a defendant to defeat the plaintiff's choice of the state whose law
would be applied to his action. 33

4

The law of the transferor

forum would thus follow a case to the transferee court. At the
same time, the court observed that the plaintiff could not resist the transfer of his action to another district on the ground
that the "transferee court will or may interpret federal law in a
manner less favorable to him.

' 33 5

The court agreed with the

Fourth Circuit that "if there is a conflict of views among circuits, 'this presents a matter for consideration by the Supreme
Court on application for certiorari, not for consideration by a
district judge on application for transfer ....
, "336 Implicit
on own initiative, issues order to show cause why actions should not be transferred
to single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings).
328 E.g., 376 U.S. at 639 ("A change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be,
with respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms."); see id. at 626-43 passim.
329 E.g., the Court's hostility to the use of § 1404(a) as a forum-shopping instrument or to a rule that would induce courts to deny transfers "despite considerations
of convenience, if to do so might conceivably prejudice the claim of a plaintiff who
had 33
initially selected a permissible forum." Id. at 636 & n.35.
0
Id. at 637.
33
1Id. at 638.
332 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), motion for leave to file petition for writ of cert. or
other appropriatewrit denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
333 See 376 U.S. at 631-33. Of course, the Supreme Court did not address itself
to the validity of the distinction drawn by the Second Circuit.
334 312 F.2d at 652-53.

335 Id. at 652 (dictum) (emphasis supplied).
33
16 Id. (quoting Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d 699, 706 (4th Cir. 1956)). See also
Ackert v. Bryan, 299 F.2d 65, rehearing denied, 299 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1962), in which
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in this analysis is the assumption that the transferee court is
not required to follow the views of the transferor court's circuit on matters of federal law. Judge Lumbard explained the
rationale for treating issues of federal law differently from
issues of state law:
The federal courts comprise a single system applying
a single body of law, and no litigant has a right to have
the interpretation of one federal court rather than
that of another determine his case.
However, insofar as the federal courts apply state
law, they apply 3the
law of fifty separate jurisdictions,
37
rather than one.
Even the Multidistrict Litigation Panel, notwithstanding
its seemingly incorrect holding when the point was squarely
raised, has, in other contexts, recognized the force of the considerations relied on by Judge Lumbard. The Panel has several
times held that "the prospect of an unfavorable ruling by the
transferee court or the possibility that another district judge
may be more favorably disposed to a litigant's contentions are
clearly not factors considered. by the Panel in determining
whether transfer under section 1407 is appropriate. '338 More
directly in point are the Panel's decisions in the Butterfield
patent 33 9 and the postal rate cases, 340 where transfers were
ordered, among other reasons, to minimize the likelihood of
inconsistent results in different courts. 34 1 These decisions must
assume that the transferee court would apply a uniform rule
of law to all of the cases before it; otherwise, the rationale
would not support the transfers. In this regard, it is worth
noting that in the postal rate litigation, the possibility of conflicting decisions was more than speculative; the various district courts had already reached inconsistent decisions on
the court upheld the transfer of a case from the Southern District of New York to
the District of Minnesota, even though an Eighth Circuit decision, in apparent
conflict with the rule in the Second Circuit, appeared to require that the Minnesota
court dismiss the action. See id. at 73-74 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
337312 F.2d at 652.
338In re 7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litigation, 358 F. Supp. 286, 287-88
(J.P.M.L. 1973); see In re Texas Gulf Sulphur Securities Litigation, 344 F. Supp.
1398, 1400 (J.P.M.L. 1972).
339 In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, 328 F. Supp. 513 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
340In re Fourth Class Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
341 See notes 251-55osupra & accompanying text.
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the question whether interim relief should be granted to the
plaintiffs.3 42
In light of these considerations, the Barrack decision need
not disturb the conclusion of the Second and Fourth Circuits
that a plaintiff may not resist the transfer of his action on the
ground that the transferee court may interpret federal law in
a manner less favorable than the court where the action was
brought. Viable, too, is the proposition that the transferee
court should be free to apply its view of federal law uniformly
to the actions transferred to it, as well as to the actions originally brought there. If these conclusions prevail, transfers
can be used, where otherwise appropriate, to achieve unitary
adjudication of the questions of federal law which arise in the
context of challenges to the validity of state statutes.
b. Availability of Transfers under PresentLaw
Before turning to details of transfer mechanisms designed
to avoid conflicts with respect to the federal validity of a California statute, it is important to note that in the most important class of cases-suits seeking injunctive or declaratory relief
against an agency or official of the state-transfers could be
effected today with no change in present law. Under sections
1391(b) and 1392(a), such actions could be brought in any
district of the state. 343 By virtue of section 1404(a), if litigation
is begun in more than one district, any of those courts have
power, upon motion by the defendant, to transfer the action to
another district "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice. 13 44 Because questions of law or fact
relating to the operation and effect of the statute are likely
to predominate over any questions affecting the rights of particular plaintiffs, 3 45 "the convenience of parties and witnesses"
is likely to be better served by a trial in any one court than by
multiple trials in several courts. In this regard, selection of a
particular court will probably be less important than the avoid342 See 298 F. Supp. at 1327.

34328 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), 1392(a) (1970). In this regard, no change would be
made by the proposed Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1973. See S. 1876, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., § 1314(a) (1973).
34428 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). See text accompanying notes 232-40 supra. Transfers may also be granted upon request of the plaintiff. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 32,
at 166.
345Compare FED.R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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ance of parallel litigation.346 As stated earlier, the pendency
of a similar action in another court is regarded as a persuasive
factor, though not a conclusive one, in the decision whether to
grant a transfer.3 47 Moreover, under the principle stated by
Judge Lumbard, no plaintiff could resist the transfer of his
action on the ground that the transferee court might interpret
federal law in a less favorable manner than the court selected
by him. 48 All that is left, then, is the general proposition that
the plaintiff has the right to bring his action in the forum of
his choice, subject only to the rules of jurisdiction and venue.
Suits seeking relief against the enforcement of a state statute,
however, would seem to fall within the principle quoted earlier: "[W]here there are hundreds of potential plaintiffs, ...
all of whom could with equal show of right go into their many
home courts, the claim of any one plaintiff that a forum is
appropriate merely because it is his home forum is considerably
'349

weakened.

All of these considerations suggest that when parallel lawsuits are brought in two or more districts, each challenging
the federal validity of a state statute and seeking an injunction or declaratory judgment against a state officer or agency,
the court where the second action is brought will often be able
to transfer that action to the district where the first action is
pending. To be sure, use of the transfer mechanism would
leave room for a certain amount of forum shopping and racing
to the courthouse.350 That is, public-issue litigants would attempt to ensure that the first challenge to a state statute was
brought in the circuit perceived as more favorable to the particular claim. If, however, the issue is one on which the circuits
have divided (in cases arising in other states, for example), or
are likely to divide, the question will probably be resolved
ultimately by the Supreme Court, and any advantage gained
would be transitory at best.
346

Cf In re Cross-Florida Barge Canal Litigation, 329 F. Supp. 543, 544 (J.P.M.L.

1971).
347See text accompanying note 236 supra.
348

See text accompanying notes 332-37 supra.

349Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S.

518, 524 (1947); see text
accompanying notes 238-40 supra.
350But cf. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L.
REv. 268, 335 (1969): "A race to the courthouse is arbitrary and unseemly, but it is
no more so than [a] race to judgment in two suits filed one after the other, and it
involves a good deal less waste."

1264

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1188

Transfers under section 1404(a) need not be limited to
situations in which the second suit is brought while the first
is still pending. On the contrary, if, after the first action has
gone to judgment in one district, a similar suit is filed in a
second district, the second court could transfer the new action
to the first forum in accordance with the principles developed
by the courts of appeals with respect to review of administrative agency orders. 35 In passing upon transfer requests,
the courts of appeals have sought to promote "the- general
Congressional purpose of avoiding forum conflicts and forum
shopping. 3 52 They have emphasized the desirability of transferring cases to a circuit "'familiar with the background of
the controversy through review of the same or related proceedings,' "35' even when the earlier proceedings have been
concluded in the other circuit. 35 4 One situation in which these
principles might be invoked is that in which a public issue
group, hoping for a different result after one circuit has upheld a state law, induces a different plaintiff to bring suit in
the other circuit.3 55 If the state then moves to transfer the
action to the district in which the first suit was adjudicated,
the court must weigh the plaintiff's presumptive right to choose
his forum against the considerations of judicial efficiency relied
on in the court of appeals transfer cases. One suspects that the
court would be reluctant to use section 1404(a) transfers as an
ad hoc device for avoiding conflict, or to deny its own circuit
an opportunity to rule on the issues raised by the plaintiff.
These last considerations are likely to carry strong weight
even when the first-instituted action is still pending in the
other court. Moreover, whatever one's conclusions about the
desirability of transfers after the first suit has gone to judgment, section 1404(a) has several other limitations as a device
for avoiding conflicts. Where the state is not a party to the
second suit, it is possible that no one would even request a
transfer.3 56 Most important, because a transfer order may for
practical purposes determine the outcome of the case, it is
35 See text accompanying notes 209-31 supra.

352 Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
3 Municipal Distrib. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54 See, e.g., Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1973); Municipal
Distrib. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
'" See text accompanying notes 133-40 supra.
35' But see text accompanying notes 363-64 & note 397 infra.
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probably unwise to remit the decision to the virtually unreviewable discretion of the district court. 7 For these reasons, if
the transfer mechanism is thought attractive as a general matter, a better approach is to devise a scheme directly addressed
to the problem at hand.
c. Kinds of Cases that Might Be Transferred
The cases which come to mind most readily as candidates
for inclusion in a transfer statute are those in which a plaintiff
seeks declaratory or injunctive relief against the enforcement
of a state statute or a generally applicable administrative order.
Appropriate language could be borrowed, with a slight modification, from the American Law Institute's proposed federal
jurisdiction statute: the provision would apply when two or
more actions are filed "seeking an injunction or declaratory
judgment against a state officer (or the state or an agency
thereof) on the ground that his acts or threatened acts, taken
under authority of a generally applicable state statute, administrative order, or constitutional provision, are contrary to the
Constitution[, treaties or laws] of the United States. ' 358 If
one is concerned with the evils of forum shopping and differential treatment, however, the stare decisis effect of a decision
granting or denying declaratory relief against a private party
defendant has as much potential for mischief as a decision for
or against the state.35 9 Consequently, it might be desirable to
bring within the statute's coverage actions seeking injunctive
or declaratory relief against the acts or threatened acts of any
person, taken under the authority of a generally applicable
3 60
statute, administrative order, or constitutional provision.
"7 See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 1137.

358See ALI STUDY, supra note 148, at 53 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1374); compare
S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1374 (1973).
The language in the text differs from that of the ALI STUDY in that it extends
to challenges based on federal treaties and laws as well as to constitutional challenges. The reason is that conflicting decisions are likely to have much the same
consequences whether the cases involve constitutional issues or statutory interpretation. Moreover, the Institute, in drafting the proposed § 1374, was mindful of
the many drawbacks of requiring cases to be heard by three judges rather than one,
and sought to limit the procedure to cases in which it found an especially compelling
justification for departing from the single-judge norm. There are no comparable
reasons for limiting the availability of a discretionary transfer provision designed
to avoid inter-circuit conflicts in the bifurcated state. See also note 406 infra.
'" Cf ALI STUDY, supra note 148, at 325.
36See, e.g., Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d
Cir. 1973).
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By the same token, legislation should extend to any case in
which the validity of a generally applicable state statute, rule
or order is drawn into question, whoever the litigants are and
whatever the procedural context may be. On the other hand,
where litigation is not brought primarily to vindicate a federal
right, or where the claim of federal invalidity is one of many
issues raised by a litigant (as in a collateral attack on a state
conviction), the plaintiff's interest in litigating in the forum
chosen by him may deserve priority. In those same cases, too,
the likelihood that the federal question will actually be adjudicated may be rather attenuated.3 61 One way of dealing with
the problem would be to exclude such cases entirely from the
operation of the transfer statute. In the interest of obtaining
maximum flexibility, however, it is probably preferable to extend the reach of the statute to the broadest category of cases,
while making clear that the court passing upon a motion for
transfer should take the countervailing considerations into
36 2
account and deny the transfer if they predominate.
d. Initiativefor Requesting Transfer
As the preceding paragraphs have suggested, there are
many different kinds of cases which can provide opportunities
for testing the federal validity of a state law, and which by the
same token may give rise to conflicting decisions and all of
the evils associated with conflict. At the same time, it is clear
that various considerations can militate against transfers, and
that these will operate with greater or less force in different
cases. It seems desirable, therefore, to avoid any provisions
for automatic transfer; instead, transfers should be permitted
in a broad class of cases, with the decision in particular cases
entrusted to a court. The next problem is to devise a mechanism by which the determination may be made.
It seems wise to place the initiative for requesting a transfer in the hands of the state.3 63 The question in the first in361 In other cases, the federal question may be so clearly settled by prior authority that as a practical matter there will be no risk of conflicting decisions; in such
cases the transfer would not be justified as a device for avoiding conflict, although
it might still be appropriate for other reasons. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
362 Of course, any new transfer legislation would supplement the provisions now
in force; thus, even if new legislation is narrowly drafted, § 1404 will often permit
transfers in situations in which the new statute might not.
363 Cf. H.R. 3805, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1971) (direct appeal from judgment
granting injunction against enforcement of state statute for repugnance to federal
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stance is whether the consequences of inconsistent decisions
loom large enough, as a practical and political matter, to invoke
the transfer mechanism. The most informed answer will come
from the agency whose practices are attacked, or, in other
cases, from the attorney general. Obviously, the right to request a transfer cannot be meaningfully exercised without an
awareness of pending litigation. Notice will be no problem in
lawsuits seeking relief against the acts of a state agency or officer, but as emphasized above, the federal validity of a statute
can be adjudicated in other contexts as well. It would therefore be necessary to enact legislation to ensure that the state
attorney general will receive notice of all federal court litigation involving the validity of state laws, and that the state will
have an opportunity to intervene as a party in such litigation,
at least to the extent of being able to request a transfer. The
statute should provide for notice and intervention not only in
cases involving issues of federal constitutionality, but also in
cases in which the challenge is based on alleged repugnance
64
to federal treaties or laws.3
e. Nature of the Tribunal
Under both section 1404(a), relating to change of venue at
the district court level, and section 2112(a), dealing with transfers at the court of appeals level, requests for transfers are
address*ed to a tribunal empowered to adjudicate the case on
its merits if the transfer is denied. In the present context,
such a provision might well be fatal to the utility of a transfer
scheme. An important goal in creating a conflict avoidance
mechanism is to eliminate, or at least to minimize, any suspicion
that transfers might be granted or denied as a stratagem to
accomplish a particular result on the merits. This means that
the tribunal which passes on motions for transfer should be
one which will not decide the case in any event, and which
will not be perceived as having any stake in the determination
Constitution, but only if state attorney general files certificate stating that immediate
consideration of the appeal by the Supreme Court is of general public importance
in the administration ofjustice).
364 A provision for notice and hearing is included in S. 271, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 5 (1973), the Senate-passed bill to abolish three judge courts. See 119 CONG.
REC. S 11,114 (daily ed. June 14, 1973); note 397 infra. As presently written, however, the requirement of S. 271 would apply only to litigation involving issues of
federal constitutionality. See note 358 supra & note 406 infra.
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of whether a particular issue is to be adjudicated by a particular circuit.
These considerations suggest that requests for transfers
should be addressed to a tribunal similar to the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation. Indeed, since the number of requests is not likely to be large, it might be convenient to assign
the responsibility to the Panel itself. The Panel has had several years' experience in making forum selection decisions on
the basis of considerations very similar to those which would
be relevant in the present context.3 6 5 The Panel is free of any
ties to either circuit.36 6 Finally, if conflict resolution mechanisms of general applicability are adopted, the Panel could be
divested of the divided state transfer responsibility without
the need for dismantling a special tribunal or administrative
machinery functioning in only the one class of cases.
How much discretion should the Panel have, and what
criteria should guide it? In its decisions under the present
statute, the Panel decides two kinds of questions: the desirability of assigning multidistrict cases to a single court, and the
selection of the transferee district. 367 The former has already
been considered. With regard to the latter, it seems desirable
to build upon the model of section 2112(a), which provides
that all petitions for review of a single administrative agency
order are to be transferred automatically to the circuit in
which the first petition was instituted; the statute contains a
provision for further transfer, but unless a party takes the
initiative, all related petitions will be adjudicated by the circuit
in which the first petition was filed. 368 It is this last aspect that
is crucial here. If the Panel's discretion is limited to transferring later-filed actions to the court where the challenge was
first raised, there is the minimum of opportunity for even the
appearance of manipulation. The determination whether to
order a transfer in a particular case can then be made on the
basis of more neutral considerations: the likelihood that the
365 See generally Transferee Courts, supra note 243, at 590-95. Compare the majority

opinion in In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, 328 F. Supp. 513 (J.P.M.L. 1970)
with that case's dissenting opinions.
366 Federal judges from the Ninth and Twelfth Circuits sitting as members of
the Panel might be required to disqualify themselves in cases involving transfers
under the new legislation.
367See, e.g., In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 341 F. Supp. 376,
381 (J.P.M.L. 1972); Transferee Courts, supra note 243, at 593-94.
36I

But see Race to the Court House, supra note 210, at 171-74.
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validity of the statute will in fact be adjudicated in both actions,
the likelihood of conflicting decisions, the consequences of
conflict, the interest of the second litigant in having his case
tried in the forum of his choosing, the extent to which other
issues will be contested, and the presence of factual questions
3 69
unique to each case.
f. Level of Transfer
In discussing the merits of a transfer mechanism, there
is a tendency to assume that transfers would be effected at the
district court level. Certainly this would be possible; but if the
concern is to avoid conflicts between the two courts of appeals,
a provision for transfers between district courts might turn
out to be statutory overkill. Transfers, after all, operate to
deny at least one litigant his choice of forum; even if the transfer request is ultimately denied, the availability of the procedure provides an opportunity for delay and vexation. These
difficulties suggest that the mechanism should be tailored as
narrowly as possible to meet the particular need created by
dividing a state between circuits. Providing for transfers only
at the appellate level would mean that the matter would not
even be raised until two courts had actually decided the merits
of an attack on the federal validity of a state statute. No doubt
it was these considerations that prompted the Commission, in
discussing transfers as a conflict-avoidance device, to cite section 2112(a), the provision dealing with transfers by Courts
of Appeals of administrative agency orders, as a model rather
than section 1404(a) or section 1407.370
Section 2112(a) is not a perfect model, however. Unlike
petitions for review of an administrative agency order, appeals
from district court adjudications of the validity of a statute cannot be expected to reach the two courts at roughly the same
time.37 1 Of course, it would be possible to permit transfers even
after the first case has been disposed of by one court of appeals;
369 See text accompanying notes 360-62 supra.
370

See COMMISSION REPORT,supra note 3, at 240.
Some might find it anomalous that decisions of a district court would be
subject to review by more than one court of appeals, but this situation exists today
under § 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-210, § 2, 85 Stat. 748-50, amending Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 201-06, 84 Stat. 799.
The statute gives the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction
of appeals from all federal district courts in cases arising under the Act. Cf. note 199
supra. See also the description of the jurisdiction of the "national division of the
371
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but in such a situation the transfer would clearly determine
the outcome, and just as clearly deprive the second court of appeals of an opportunity to reach the issue. As an abstract matter, there is nothing wrong with this result; for instance, in suits
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against a state officer
or agency, the judgment in one circuit-or for that matter one
district-will have a binding effect throughout the state, even
without any transfers.3 72 The difference lies in how the two
situations are likely to be perceived. It is one thing when a single in personam judgment restrains a defendant's conduct outside as well as within the court's territorial jurisdiction; it may
be quite another when a transfer procedure precludes a second
court of equal status from ever deciding an issue which would
otherwise come before it.
g. Transfer Mechanisms Generally
Whatever mechanisms are devised for assigning the transfer decision to a neutral tribunal, the result is to limit adjudication of the merits of the federal claim to one circuit, and to
exclude participation by the other. From one point of view,
this should not be objectionable. A variety of factors militate
against either circuit's developing a reputation as being especially receptive or hostile to challenges to state statutes. Both
circuits can be expected to draw a majority of their judges from
the state of California, and the nominations of those judges
would generally be subject to the same influences, including
vetoes by the same Senators.373 Moreover, most cases would
be decided by randomly selected panels of three judges, making it more difficult for either court to develop "a distinct
ideological bias. '374 In particular cases, it will probably be
more a matter of chance than calculation whether the initial
United States Court of Appeals" in SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 88, at 7, and of
the "national panel" proposed by former Solicitor General Griswold, in Griswold
Interview, supra note 82, at 5, 7.
312 See text accompanying notes 114-17 supra.
M"See H. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 43-45 (1972).

314 Commission Hearings, supra note 23, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30, 1973, at
72 (testimony of Judge Browning). But see id., Los Angeles, Cal., Aug. 31, 1973,
at 33-34 (testimony of Assistant U.S. Attorney Campbell). Indeed, it would probably
be difficult today to point to any of the courts of appeals as being consistently more
favorable or less favorable than others to federal constitutional claims. This in turn
may be attributable to the tendency of panels on at least some courts to go their own
way without great regard for what other panels are deciding. See Griswold, The
JudicialProcess, 31 FED. B.J. 309, 325 (1972).
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challenge is brought in one circuit or the other; 375 constitutional cases are therefore likely to be litigated in both circuits
with roughly equal frequency. If this analysis is correct, neither
northern nor southern Californians should have any reason
to feel a sense of affront that the validity of a particular statute
3 76
is adjudicated by the other circuit rather than their own.
Notwithstanding these considerations, Congress may conclude that appellate decisions as to the validity of California
laws should not be made by a tribunal with jurisdiction over
only a portion of the state. There are two ways of avoiding that
situation: the creation of special tribunals, composed either of
judges from both circuits or of judges associated with neither
circuit; or a requirement that conflicts between the circuits be
settled by the Supreme Court.
3.

Specially Constituted Tribunals

Venue restrictions and transfer mechanisms are devices
for avoiding conflicts by assuring that decisions on the validity
of state laws are made by only one of the two circuits with
jurisdiction in the state. By their very nature, such solutions
exclude one of the circuits from participation in the decisional
process, a consequence which may be found unacceptable. We
turn, therefore, to mechanisms which escape this liability,
either by providing a role for both circuits or by remitting the
final determination to a neutral tribunal.
One solution would be to permit cases involving- the
federal validity of state laws to be heard and decided by the
two courts of appeals sitting en banc together. Such hearings
could be granted in accordance with the flexible criteria used
today to determine whether cases are to be heard en banc by
375 The forum for the initial challenge may depend, for instance, on the identity
and location of the particular group or individual who first comes to feel that the
issue is ripe for testing. Moreover, even where tactical considerations come into
play, the litigant may be more interested in bringing the case before a particular
trial court than in a particular circuit. According to testimony at Commission hearings,
there is a certain amount of forum shopping today in three judge court cases, even
though such cases may be appealed as of right to the Supreme Court. Commission
Hearings, supra note 23, Los Angeles, Cal., Aug. 31, 1973, at 32 (testimony of Assistant U.S. Attorney Campbell).
376 Indeed, one should not be too quick to assume that Californians in one
section of the state or the other would regard one circuit as "their own," or that
residents of the state other than attorneys would even be conscious of which circuit
is responsible for striking down a state law.
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a single circuit. 37 7 Thus, joint en banc hearings need not be
limited to situations of actual conflict; they might also be appropriate for questions of great public importance,3 7 8 or in situations in which it is thought' desirable to settle an issue at the
earliest possible time, to avoid even the chance of conflict
3 79
between the circuits.
A joint en banc procedure carries overtones of a proposal,
rejected by the Commission, to "restructure" the present Ninth
Circuit into two "divisions" rather than create two new circuits. 38 0 The difference is that under the plan discussed here,
a proceeding involving both circuits would be invoked only.in
the one circumstance in which there is a special need for it;
otherwise, the two circuits could function independently, without any need "to coordinate the activities of the two divisional
headquarters and the directives of the two divisional chief
judges. '3 81 Nor would there be any need for the two courts
to attempt to maintain a consistency of decisional law, except
with respect to issues raised by challenges to the federal validity of California laws. Providing for joint en banc hearings only
in the one class of cases would thus mitigate the drawbacks
feared by the Commission if the "divisional" structure were
adopted.
This is not to say that the procedure would be free of
difficulties. The two courts together would have at least fifteen, and perhaps as many as eighteen, judges.38 2 The experience of the Fifth Circuit has been that en banc hearings pose
serious problems, in terms of both logistics and the adjudicative process, when the number of judges participating is fifteen.38 3 The same problems militate against the desirability

of convening such a large body of judges in order to prevent
317See generally Note, supra note 73, at 578-98.

'78 See id. 586-92; cf. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2).
79Cf Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 825-27 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Timbers, J., dissenting from denial of reconsideration en banc), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 1536
(1974); Note, supra note 73, at 586.
'8oSee COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 241.
381 Id. 242.
382 See id. 235. In 1972 the Judicial Conference urged the creation of two new
circuit judgeships for the present Ninth Circuit, to bring the total to 15. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROCEEDINGS 36 (1972).
383 See Commission Hearings, supra note 23, New Orleans, La., Aug. 22, 1973, at
150-52 (testimony of Judge Godbold); Statement with Reference to Circuit Realignment submitted by eight active judges of the Fifth Circuit to the Commission, Aug.
23, 1973, at 2, on file at the Commission.
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Californians from experiencing the consequences of conflicting decisions. Moreover, because the procedure is so cumbersome-especially with the judges scattered from Hawaii to
Montana to Arizona-the court might be reluctant to grant
joint en banc hearings in some cases in which they would serve
38 4
the purpose envisioned for them.
To avoid these problems, the function of resolving conflicts on the validity of California laws might be assigned to a
panel of judges selected from the two circuits, rather than to
all of them. Various methods of selection could be devised;
for instance, the panel might be composed of the four most
senior judges, together with the three most junior.38 5 The
objections to such a procedure are much the same as those
raised to the selection method suggested by the Freund Study
Group for their proposed National Court of Appeals; 38 6 the
validity of California laws, the argument goes, should not
turn on the decision of any randomly convened group of
judges. 38 7 On the other hand, the fear of creating opportunities for "packing" a court according to political inclinations
or judicial philosophy would probably rule out such methods
as selection by the President or even the Chief Justice. 38 8 Even
if an acceptable method of selection can be found, there remains Judge Friendly's caveat that limiting en banc proceedings "to a reviewing division,

. .

.would inevitably breed justi-

fiable dissension." 38 9
One can invent other ways in which a special tribunal
could be constituted, but these require no more than a brief
mention. For instance, it would hardly seem worthwhile to
create a "fourth tier" court intermediate between the Courts

With an en banc court of 15 judges, the' hearing alone consumes judge time
in which five cases could be heard by panels. See Note, supra note 73, at 576-77.
"15Because the courts of appeals are national as well as regional courts, it would
be undesirable to create any system limiting the panel to California judges.
386 STUDY GROUP, supra note 72, at 591.
387Cf, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 52-53 (1973).
3 88
But see Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, § 211(b)(1), Pub.
L. No. 92-210, § 2, 85 Stat. 749, amending Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 201-06, 84 Stat.
799. An intriguing possibility would be to assign cases to a panel consisting of nine
judges, one selected by each of the Justices of the Supreme Court from among the
judges of the two circuits.
...H. FRIENDLY, supra note 387, at 45. Judge Godbold of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals expressed a similar view. Commission Hearings, supra note 23, New Orleans,
La., Aug. 22, 1973, at 151-52 (testimony of Judge Godbold).
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of Appeals and the Supreme Court. 390 Nor would the judges
or the public be likely to accept any plan which assigned the
decision-making power to a tribunal composed of judges selected from outside both circuits. It should be noted, however,
that if Congress accepts the recommendations of an American
Bar Association group 39 1 and the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice 3 92 for the creation of a new court, or "division,"
to resolve inter-circuit conflicts, that tribunal might appropriately be entrusted with the function of resolving conflicts
between federal courts over the validity of California laws.
4.

Supreme Court Resolution

If it is thought undesirable either to exclude one of the
circuits from the decisional process or to create a new tribunal
for reconciling the differences between them, a third alternative may appear attractive: assigning the conflict-resolution
function to the Supreme Court of the United States. It has
already been suggested that in those situations in which the
Ninth and Twelfth Circuits hand down inconsistent decisions
with respect to the federal validity of a state statute, the issue
is likely to be one that the Supreme Court will take for review
in any event because of the difficulty or the fundamental clash
of values involved. 393 The existence of a conflict would furnish
an additional, and perhaps decisive, reason for granting review. Nevertheless, Congress may conclude that it is not sufficient to rely on the Court's discretion-that the possibility
of conflicting adjudications on the validity of a state law at the
court of appeals level is so serious that in the absence of other
mechanisms (or even notwithstanding their availability), the
Supreme Court must be compelled by statute to resolve the
conflict. The realignment bill now before the Senate reflects
this view. It would amend section 1254 of the Judicial Code3 94
to provide that cases in the courts of appeals could be reviewed
390Cf SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 88, at 5 (listing among its principles "a
'fourth tier' of courts should be avoided if at all possible").
39"Id. The Committee's recommendation that Congress create a "national
division of the United States Courts of Appeals" for the purpose, among others,
of eliminating inter-circuit conflicts was approved by the ABA House of Delegates
at its midwinter 1974 meeting.
392 ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 88.

313 See text accompanying notes 172-79 supra.
394 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970).
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[b]y appeal, where is drawn in question, the validity
of a State statute or of an administrative order of
statewide application on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States: Provided, however, that this subsection
shall apply only when the court of appeals certifies
that its decision is in conflict with the decision of
another court of appeals with respect to the validity
of the same statute or administrative order under3 95the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.
The proposed amendment has the advantage of being
narrowly directed to the potential conflicts that have aroused
the greatest apprehension among judges and members of the
bar in the Ninth Circuit. Whatever its merits, however, the
amendment is largely superfluous. Under the present section
1254(2), an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as of
395 S. 2988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1974). Of course, the fact that a case comes
within the Court's appeal jurisdiction does not mean that it will receive plenary
consideration. See Sup. CT. R. 15(1)(f); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE 193-202, 230-34 (4th ed. 1969). Nor will summary affirmance by the Court
of a case coming within its appeal jurisdiction necessarily settle the underlying federal issues. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454-55 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Gibson v. Berryhill, "411 U.S. 564, 576 (1973); STUDY GROUP, supra note 72,
at 596. These difficulties should not seriously affect the usefulness of the mandatory
review procedure included in the Senate bill, however. If the Court summarily
affirms the judgment in a case appealed under the proposed § 1254(4), the bench
and bar in both circuits could justifiably assume that the other circuit's contrary
decision had been overruled. This would be equally true whether the state law had
been upheld or struck down by the decision from which the appeal is taken. A summary reversal; on the other hand, would leave the decision of the other circuit to
stand unchallenged within the state. (Summary reversal is unlikely, however, unless
an intervening decision by the Court has settled the underlying federal issue. See
R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra, 233-34). In either event, the statute would serve
the purpose of eliminating uncertainty caused by the existence of conflicting circuit court decisions. Of course, to the extent that uncertainty results from the generally unsettled state of the law, see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring), Californians will be no better off than anyone
else. It is worth noting that the California bar is familiar with the state supreme
court's practice of "disapproving" decisions of the intermediate appellate courts
which are inconsistent with supreme court rulings. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court,
7 Cal. 3d 186, 206, 496 P.2d 1205, 1220, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 852 (1972).
There remains the possibility that the United States Supreme Court might
dismiss an appeal under the proposed § 1254(4) for lack of jurisdiction. First, an
appeal lies only if the case draws in question the validity of state law on the ground
of repugnance to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. This phrase
is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970), which governs review by appeal from
state court decisions. See text accompanying notes 398-406 infra. If, in accordance
with its interpretation of section 1257(2), the Court finds that the case does not
draw in question the validity of a state statute, but, for instance, only the validity
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right "by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of
appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States ...."396 This means that if the new
Ninth Circuit strikes down a California statute after the
Twelfth Circuit has upheld it, the Ninth Circuit decision may
be appealed to the Supreme Court as of right. The conflict
would thus be resolved by the Supreme Court. If the decision
creating the conflict is the one holding the statute valid, that
decision would not fall within the Supreme Court's appeal
jurisdiction, but of course the first decision, holding the law
invalid, would have been subject to appeal; and it seems reasonable to suggest that if the state would be satisfied only with a
Supreme Court resolution of the issue, it should have taken
the appeal at the time of the first decision.
This discussion assumes that the state will be a party to
any court of appeals litigation in which the validity of a state
statute is at issue. Under present law, this assumption is not
justified; but, as already suggested, legislation could easily be
enacted to ensure that the state attorney general receives notice
of all federal court litigation involving the validity of state
laws and that the state has an opportunity to intervene as a
party in such litigation, and to take an appeal if the losing
397
private litigant chooses not to do so.
of an official's particular exercise of his statutory powers, the appeal will be dismissed. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 637-40; R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra, 109-10; STUDY GROUP, supra note 72, at 604-06. Second, the Court might
conclude that the certifying court of appeals erred in finding that its decision was
"in conflict with the decision of another court of appeals with respect to the validity
of the same statute or administrative order under the Constitution, treaties, or laws
of the United States." S. 2988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1974). One must assume
that the Court would not reach that conclusion unless it was persuaded that the
two decisions could be harmonized, so that Californians would not be bedeviled
by the problems of inconsistent rulings. That question is probably academic, however,
for the wording of the proposed statute suggests that certification by the second
court of appeals is both necessary and sufficient to satisfy the second jurisdictional
prerequisite. Under this reading, the Supreme Court would not be free to re-examine
the court of appeals determination that a conflict exists. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1254
(3) (1970) (governing certification of questions of law by the courts of appeals);
see also H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 1585-86; Moore & Vestal, Present
and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 42-45
(1949). In any event, if the appeal is dismissed, the Court may still grant certiorari
to resolve the issues involved. 28 U.S.C. § 2103 (1970); City of El Paso v. Simmons,
379 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1965); see, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 538, granting
cert. to 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974).
396
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1970).
3
97See text accompanying notes 363-64 supra. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) now permits
a state officer or agency to intervene in an action whenever a party "relies for ground
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By its terms, section 1254(2) applies only to state "statutes,"
not to state administrative orders or constitutional provisions.
Because few appeals have been taken under this provision,
of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by" the agency
or officer, "or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or
made pursuant to the statute or executive order ...." The rule, however, does not
give the state a right to intervene; in considering the state's application, the court
must consider "whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
24.10[5] (1974). Moreover, the provision does not apply to cases involving the
validity of statutes which are not administered by an agency.
The Senate bill to eliminate the three judge court requirement in constitutional
litigation, except for reapportionment cases, includes a provision to ensure that
the state attorney general will receive notice of all federal court litigation in which
the constitutionality of "any statute of that state affecting the public interest is
drawn in question." S. 271, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1973); see 119 CONG. REC.
S 11,114 (daily ed. June 14, 1973). The state would then be permitted to intervene
for the presentation of evidence and for argument on the question of constitutionality.
Upon intervention, the state would have, "subject to the applicable provisions of law,
• . .all the rights of a party . . . to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of
the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality."
In the present context, the crucial question is whether this provision would
give the state the right to appeal from a decision holding a state law unconstitutional
if the private litigant relying on the law chose not to do so. The proposed statute
is modeled upon 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1970), which permits intervention by the United
States when the constitutionality of an act of Congress is called into question. The
question whether the United States may alone take an appeal from a judgment of
unconstitutionality appears never to have been litigated in a reported case. Commentators at the time the provision was first enacted expressed doubts about the
constitutionality of such an appeal. 38 CoLuM. L. REV. 153, 156-62 (1938); 51 HARv.
L. REV. 148, 149-51 (1937). A more recent discussion suggests that because the
government is "charged as sovereign with the protection of the public interest,"
it might be possible to justify an appeal by the United States from a holding of unconstitutionality which the private litigants were willing to accept. 65 HARv. L. REV.
319, 322-23 (1951). However that may be, the paucity of litigation on the issue
suggests that in practice, litigants who rely on statutes challenged as unconstitutional
are willing to appeal from adverse decisionf whenever the government wishes to
do so. (Of course, it is quite uncommon today for a court to hold a federal statute
unconstitutional.) Indeed, the phenomenon which largely prompted the enactment
of what is now § 2403-the use of collusive suits to challenge the validity of legislation, see 38 COLuM. L. REV. at 153-54; 51 HARV. L. REV. at 149 n.3-appears largely
to have vanished. This may result from the different character of the issues litigated.
Cf. Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 411 (1960).
These issues are largely theoretical. Whether or not S. 271 is enacted, the state
will be a party to most litigation in which the federal validity of a state law is drawn
in question; where the state is not initially a party, the courts will often allow intervention under rule 24(b); and where the state is not made a party, a litigant relying
on a state law can be expected to appeal a judgment holding the law invalid when
another federal court has reached, or might plausibly reach, a contrary decision.
Under neither the proposed § 1254(4) nor the present law could the state appeal from a court of appeals decision, not otherwise appealable by it, if the court
ruled in favor of the validity of a state law. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Brashear
Freight Lines, 306 U.S. 204, 206 (1939). It might appear from the literal language of
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1970) that the state could ask the Supreme Court to review a
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the Supreme Court has not often had occasion to construe
it, 398 but similar language in the statute governing review of
state court decisions has been interpreted very broadly. Section
1257(2) of the Judicial Code 399 permits an appeal as of right
from a state court decision upholding "a statute of any state"
against a claim that it is repugnant to the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States. The Court has said that the term
"statute" includes "[a]ny enactment, from whatever source
originating, to which a State gives the force of law, ' 400 and
"every act legislative in character to which the State gives
sanction, no distinction being made between acts of the state
'40
legislature and other exertions of state law-making power." '
Under this approach, appeals have been held to lie from decisions upholding an order of the regents of the state univer40 4
sity, 40 2 court rules, 40 3 regulations of administrative agencies,
and even municipal ordinances. 40

5

If

the legislative history

of the proposed section 1254(4) were to make clear that "statute" is to be interpreted in accordance with the construction
given the word in cases appealed under section 1257(2), it
would be unnecessary to refer explicitly to administrative
40 6
orders as well as to statutes.

Apart from the niceties of statutory drifting, the trend
of scholarly opinion in recent years has been to oppose retencase by certiorari even though the state had prevailed on all issues in the court of
appeals. To allow such a petition, however, "would seem to be inconsistent with
the Court's settled refusal to entertain an appeal by a party successful in obtaining
a final judgment in his favor in the lower court." R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra
note 395, at 30. This alone would suggest that if the state wishes to assure Supreme
Court resolution of an issue concerning the validity of a state law, it should seek
review of any adverse decision, whether or not litigation is in progress in the other
circuit. Such a practice would render the proposed amendment to § 1254 unnecessary.
"'See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 330, at 31.
399 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970).
400 Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 183 (1877).
401 Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 258 (1934). See R. STERN
& E. GRESSMAN, supra note 395, at 83-84; H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at
641-42.
402 Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
403 Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
404 La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18
(1949); Sultan Ry. v. Department of Labor, 277 U.S. 135 (1928).
405 King Mfg. Co. v. City Council, 277 U.S. 100 (1928).
406 Adding a reference to "administrative orders" also carries

a risk,

albeit

probably a small one, that the courts might give an undesirably narrow reading to
the new provision. That is, the term "statute" might be held to exclude not only
administrative orders, but also other "exertions of state lawmaking power," see
note 401 supra, which might not be characterized in common parlance as "statutes,"
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tion of the Supreme Court's appeal jurisdiction and to favor
making all cases reviewable only by certiorari. 40 7 Although
the Freund Study Group's proposal for a National Court of
Appeals aroused wide controversy, there was general approbation for its suggestion that the appeal jurisdiction be abolished. 40 8 If the Study Group's recommendations on this point
are accepted, section 1254(2) would no longer assure Supreme
Court review of one of two conflicting decisions by a court of9
40
appeals with respect to the federal validity of a state law.
The proposed section 1254(4) would then serve an independent function, but by the same token it would appear to be
inconsistent with the policies suggesting the repeal of section
1254(2).410 While one might regret an inroad on the principle
but which have been held to fall within the term as used in § 1257(2). See notes
400-05 supra. Moreover, the proposed statute approaches dangerously closely to
the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), which requires three judge courts in certain
constitutional cases ("any . . . statute . . . or . . . an order made by an administrative

board or commission acting under State statutes ....").That statute has been interpreted more narrowly than § 1257(2). See ALI STUDY, supra note 148, at 320-22;
H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 969-72. There is all the more reason,
therefore, to follow the relevant language of § 1257(2) in haec verba.
At the same time, the proposal sensibly extends to claims under federal treaties
and laws as well as to constitutional claims, clearly following the pattern of § 1257(2)
rather than § 2281. The consequences of conflicting decisions will be equally pernicious whether the conflict involves constitutional or statutory interpretation,
although in the latter instance Congress as well as the courts could settle the question
one way or the other. Cf. ALI STUDY, supra note 148, at 322.
407 See, e.g., STUDY GROUP, supra note 72, at 595-605; Moore & Vestal, supra
note 395, at 42, 44; authorities cited in note 408 infra.
408 See, e.g.,

H. FRIENDLY, supra note 387, at 50; Gressman, The National Court

of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253, 258 (1973).
409Other routes to Supreme Court review would, of course, remain open. The
Study Group's proposals would not affect the Court's power, under 28 U.S.C. §
1254(l) (1970), to grant certiorari to review any case in a court of appeals before the
court of appeals has rendered judgment. Under Sup. CT. R. 20, the writ will be
granted "only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance
as to justify the deviation from normal appellate processes and to require immediate
settlement in this court." This mechanism might be appropriate in those rare cases
in which parallel lawsuits in the two circuits threaten to result in conflicting orders
being addressed to a state agency.
The Study Group does recommend repeal of the authorization for certification
of questions from a court of appeals to the Supreme Court. STUDY GROUP, supra
note 72, at 603. Other authorities, however, have suggested that the certification
procedure can be used to advantage as a means of resolving conflicts among, or
perhaps even within, the circuits. Moore & Vestal, supra note 395, at 35-37. (At the
same time, the authors urge that certification not invoke the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction. Id. at 43-44).
410 Apart from the problems discussed in note 395 supra, the appeal jurisdiction
is believed undesirable because of the burdens it places on the Supreme Court;
the "complications for counsel and the Court arising from a bifurcated system of
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that the Supreme Court should not be required to hear appeals,
the practical effect on the Court's docket is likely to be small;
it would be surprising if even three or four cases a year were
411
appealed under the proposed amendment.
III.

CONCLUSION

The likelihood that conflicting judgments or inconsistent
rules of law would result from the allocation of California's
judicial districts between two circuits cannot be predicted with
confidence. Moreover, the frequency with which such conflicts
might occur does not provide an adequate measure of the
seriousness of the problem; a sharp increase in forum-shopping in diversity tort cases might be regarded as a low price to
pay for the benefits of a more equitable division of appellate
caseloads, while a single instance in which a state agency was
caught between conflicting commands of federal courts might
review," STUDY GROUP, supra, note 72, at 605; and the ambiguity of the resulting
summary dispositions. As stated in the text, cases certified under the proposed
§ 1254(4) are not likely to add significantly to the Court's workload, but the other
objections cannot be put aside so easily. Even more than existing provisions permitting
appeals, the proposed legislation would require the Supreme Court to adjudicate
the merits of a federal claim which almost by hypothesis will involve perplexing and
sensitive issues, at a time when the Court may believe the issues not ripe for consideration. Although the Court may affirm or reverse summarily without foreclosing
its ultimate resolution of the questions, such summary action "creates problems for
lower courts and makes unnecessary work for the .Court itself in the future as litigants, uncertain of the significance of a summary disposition, seek clarification by
bringing to the Court other cases raising the same point." Id. These problems could
be avoided, without exposing Californians to the consequences of conflicting decisions, by using a transfer mechanism rather than requiring the Supreme Court to
resolve conflicts.
411 The proposed statute diverges from the usual pattern in that invocation of
the Court's jurisdiction would require action both by a litigant and by the court
below. Compare, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(2), 1254(3) (1970). In this respect the closest
parallel in existing law is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), permitting appeals to the courts
of appeals from certain interlocutory orders of the district courts. By mandating
that the conflict be certified as such by the second court of appeals, the provision
seeks to assure that the Supreme Court will not have to spend any undue amount of
time puzzling over a litigant's attenuated claim that a conflict exists. But see note 395
supra. Compare H.R. 3805, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1971) (reprinted in Ammerman,
Three-Judge Courts, 52 F.R.D. 293, 313, 315 (1971)) (permitting direct appeal from
judgment granting injunction against enforcement of state statute for repugnance
to federal Constitution, but only if state attorney general certifies that immediate
consideration by Supreme Court "is of general public importance in the administration of justice"; Supreme Court has discretion to deny direct appeal and remand
case to appropriate court of appeals).
The mechanics of the certification process are left to be worked out by the
courts. Presumably the initiative would lie with a litigant unsuccessful in the court
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be regarded as too high a price regardless of the benefits to
judicial administration that might be achieved through bifurcating a state. Further, mechanisms appropriate for avoiding
one kind of conflict may be unnecessarily cumbersome in other
situations.
One generalization does bear repeating: none of the conflicts likely to arise in the divided-state situation are unique.
A judicial system which can handle the delicate problems raised
by federal injunctions against state-court proceedings and the
logistical problems raised by multitudinous suits in related
antitrust cases should be equal to the task of preserving harmony between two federal appellate courts sitting within one
state.
of appeals. Cf note 397 supra. The principal question is at what point he would be
required to seek the certification. This in turn may depend on whether the procedure is regarded as essentially part of the Supreme Court's processes or as the
last step at the court of appeals level, similar to a petition for rehearing. Under the
first approach, a party seeking to appeal pursuant to proposed § 1254(4) might be
required, at the time of filing the notice of appeal, see Sup. CT. R. 10, to make a motion
in the court of appeals asking that court to certify that a conflict exists within the
terms of the statute. Cf FED. R. App. P. 5. If such a procedure is adopted, it might
be desirable for the Supreme Court to amend its rules to make clear that if the court
of appeals denies the motion to certify, the jurisdictional statement would be treated
as a timely petition for certiorari. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2103 (1970); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 395, at 89-92. The other way of handling the matter would be to
require a party seeking Supreme Court review under proposed § 1254(4) to make
the motion for certification of the conflict in accordance with the rules now governing petitions for rehearing, and perhaps within the same time limits. See FED. R. App. P.
40(a). The Supreme Court, too, could then treat the motion as analogous to a petition for rehearing in the court below, so that the time for filing a petition for certiorari
or a notice of appeal would not begin to run until the court of appeals had acted on
the motion. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 395, at 248-50, 332.
Other procedural matters deserving attention are the format and contents of the
motion to certify and of the certification statement itself. Is it sufficient for the
party, and later the court of appeals, simply to identify the earlier decision which
is claimed to be in conflict with the case in which review is sought? Or should a more
detailed explanation be required? Cf 3D CIR. R. 22 (effective May 1, 1974) (requiring
petition for rehearing on ground of conflict to cite conflicting cases specifically).
In practice, the opinion of the second court of appeals is likely to discuss the nature
of the conflict in as much detail as the Supreme Court might want, so that elaborate
supporting documents would probably be superfluous.

